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Logic and equity would seem to demand that when administrativeagencies are creditors
to a bankrupt debtor, thej should have the same status as other creditors. But a creditor
ageng retains its regulatory authority over the debtor, permitting it to continue with ageng
business such as conducting enforcement proceedings and awarding licenses. As a result,
though bankmptc law and polip both strongly support equal distribution of the estate,
administrative agencies have been able to circumvent these goals through the use of
"shapeshfting" behaviors. This Article evaluates two dangerous shapeshzfting scenarios:
(1) where the agencj avoids the limitations of creditor status by piercing the corporate veil
and bringing its claims against the debtor's individual stakeholders; and (2) where the
ageng operates in two distinct roles within a single proceeding, such as its dual identity as
creditor and regulator under the Second Thursday doctrine. Through these behaviors,
agencies take advantage of deferentialjudicial review to prioritize the debts they are owed
over other creditors.
This Article concludes that, when administrative agencies maintain a self-interested
position in bankruptc litigation, the balance must shift away from traditionaljudicial
deference to offer stronger protections to other creditors and to maintain the separation of
powers. To begin the work of remeding shapeshifting behavior, this Article proposes two
modest solutions. First, existing Bankmuptcy Code provisions suggest that Congress may
favor a statutor amendment that enhances the scrutiny of shapeshfiting agencies. This
could be accomplished through a statutoy bar on creditor veil piercing or, at minimum, the
imposition of a notice and hearing requirement. Second, shapeshifting behavior, once
recognized, should be afforded only Skidmore deference.
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INTRODUCTION

The integrity of the bankruptcy system relies primarily on
the
bankruptcy court's ability to maximize recoveries for a debtor's
stakeholders and equitably distribute the remaining assets. When a debtor
files for bankruptcy protection, creditors often do not recoup their debts in
full and may receive only "pennies on the dollar."' Forgiving unpaid debt
in this way conflicts with our fundamental notions of fairness. Congress
sought to impose a degree of equity on an inherently inequitable process by

&

1. See Charles R. Sterbach & Keriann M. Atencio, Why Johnny Can't Get Paid on His
General Unsecured Claims: A Potpourri of Lingering Abuses in Chapter II Cases, 14 J. BANKR. L.
PRAc. 111, 112 (2005) ("Based on the priority schemes embedded in the Bankruptcy Code,
unsecured creditors assume the risks associated with the debtor's insolvency, and often
expect pennies on the dollar in any bankruptcy case."). For example, a Delaware
bankruptcy judge recently confirmed a plan of reorganization in the Quicksilver, Inc.
Chapter 11 case that provided less than 10% recovery to general unsecured claims. See
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization of the
Debtors, In re Quicksilver, Inc., No. 15-11880-BLS (Bankr. D. Del.Jan. 29, 2016).
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enacting bankruptcy laws under its Article I, Section 8 powers. 2 Without
the order and structure created by the Bankruptcy Code (the Code),
debtors could selectively pay only preferred debts and savvy creditors could
siphon off as much value as possible from the estate to the detriment of the
remaining creditors. Thus, orderly administration of the bankruptcy
process is vital to Congress's constitutional entitlement to aptly, and
appropriately, legislate a bankruptcy system.
Creditors take many forms, including employees, trade vendors, equity
holders, secured lenders, and taxing authorities.3 Administrative agencies
looking to recover debts for unpaid regulatory fees or penalties may also be
among the creditors of a bankrupt corporation. Yet, these agencies are not
ordinary creditors. Administrative agencies operate through legislative
grants of executive authority. Such grants, called "organic acts," set forth
relevant standards for agency action, including the agency's breadth of
authority, jurisdiction, mandates, and general policy objectives.4 The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides additional guidance for
agency behavior.5 Under the APA, agencies receive deferential review
when they have been granted "interpretive or adjudicatory power" to
perform their regulatory goal, usually through rulemaking and case-specific
adjudication, respectively. 6 The limits of agency actions and the standards
by which they should be judged are a common subject of legal scholarship,
yet few have discussed whether agencies should be treated differently when
they are also creditors in a bankruptcy case. Notably, agency creditors
maintain their regulatory abilities during the pendency of a bankruptcy

2. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Histor of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 25 (1995) (discussing the development of American bankruptcy law
to "faciltat[e]

the equitable and efficient administration and distribution of the debtor's

property to creditors").
3.

See Mark

J.

Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking

Upends the Creditors' Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1243-46 (2013) (evaluating the various
classes of creditors and their distribution priorities under the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)).

4.
5.

See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, Pub L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2012)). The 1947 Attorney General's Manual
on the APA explains four basic goals of the Act: (1) "To require agencies to keep the public
currently informed of their organization, procedures and rules (sec. 3)"; (2) "To provide for
public participation in the rule making process (sec. 4)"; (3) "To prescribe uniform standards
for the conduct of formal rule making (sec. 4 (b)) and adjudicatory proceedings (sec. 5), i.e.,
proceedings which are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing (secs. 7 and 8)"; and (4) "To restate the law of judicial review (sec. 10)."
ATTORNEY GENERAL TOM C. CLARK,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947).

6.

See In re UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting in which cases

deference is appropriate)).
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case, complete with the judicial deference that Article III courts give to
their actions.7
This Article addresses the unchecked manipulation that occurs when
administrative agencies shift between their roles as creditor and regulator to
obtain preferential treatment in bankruptcy cases, a process I call
"shapeshifting." A "shapeshifter" is defined as "one that seems able to
change form or identity at will," 8 which is a concept that has been a

mainstay of folklore, mythology, religious tradition, and science fiction for
centuries.9 By strategically shifting between overlapping roles, creditor
agencies may overstep their statutory purpose and threaten the integrity of
both the administrative state and the bankruptcy process. The treatment of
shapeshifting agencies within the bankruptcy process has until now
remained a silent scandal. Recent cases indicate that agencies are
extending the boundaries of their statutory role and using their deferential
standard of review to gain preferential treatment in bankruptcy cases where
they are creditors.' 0 If left unchecked, shapeshifting agencies have the
power to disrupt the careful balance of incentives supporting public trust in
the bankruptcy system.
After evaluating two key shapeshifting scenarios and balancing the
underlying policy motivations-namely, the structure of the bankruptcy
process and the role of administrative agencies-this Article concludes that
the traditional deferential approach to regulatory actions must fade away
when administrative agencies maintain a self-interested creditor position in
a bankruptcy case. The danger of abuse is greatest when an agency (1)
shapeshifts to collect debts outside of the bankruptcy process; and (2) acts as
both creditor and regulator within a single bankruptcy case in a way that
creates an unacceptable conflict of interest. This Article does not attempt
to evaluate or modify the shapeshifting behavior of administrative agencies
outside the context of bankruptcy. Though attention should be cast upon
such behavior in all settings, a shapeshifting agency's actions are
7. See infia Part II (discussing the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's)
regulation of certain bankrupt entities). Such proceedings will be upheld on appeal to an
Article III court unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
8. Shapeshifter, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/shape-shifter (last visited May 21, 2016).
9. See, e.g., Stephan Grundy, Shapeshifting and Berserkergang, in 3 DISPUTATIO 104, 10405, 118 (Carol Poster & Richard Utz, eds., 1998) ("The assumed form exists, in some
manner, separately from the being who is donning it: it embodies the foreign capabilities
and nature which the shapeshifter wishes to assume."); Shapeshifters, Shapeshifting, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FANTASY 858-59 John Clute & John Grant eds., 1999) (detailing famous
shapeshifters throughout literary history).
10. See infia Parts IIA, II.B.
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particularly concerning when used to circumvent the established equitable
distribution procedures of the bankruptcy process.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I first discusses the core
purposes of the Code, including the preservation of the estate's remaining
assets through the automatic stay and the equitable distribution of those
assets to creditors. Next, Part I highlights the tension that occurs when
agencies assume the role of a creditor within a bankruptcy case, yet retain
(and utilize) their regulatory authority to circumvent the equitable
distribution of the estate, a core bankruptcy purpose. By looking to
Supreme Court precedent, this Part sets forth the established boundaries of
regulatory actions within or connected to a corporation in bankruptcy
while also exposing open questions that remain.
Part II addresses two problematic instances of shapeshifting agency
behavior: (1) piercing the corporate veil to affix an insolvent corporation's
liability onto an individual; and (2) using agency-created tools-such as the
Second Thursday doctrine-to act as both creditor and regulator in the same
bankruptcy case. Part II additionally extends the factual situations to their
hypothetical end to fully portray the potential impact of unchecked
shapeshifting behavior. Part III provides an analytical framework to
highlight the inadequacy of existing checks by looking to the principalagent model. Part IV suggests two potential solutions to protect the
intended flexibility of the existing regulatory scheme while also limiting
shapeshifting behavior that undermines the Bankruptcy Code's protections.
This proposal includes statutory modification to limit regulatory action
when the agency is a creditor and decreased deference in situations where
shapeshifting may occur in a way that undermines core bankruptcy
purposes.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. RestructuringIncentives: The Protection of the Automatic Stay
Facing unsustainable debt obligations, insolvent corporations or other
business entities find refuge in the Code. Designed to restructure or
liquidate a company, Chapters 7 and 11 of the Code provide a mechanism
for a company to discharge debts while also allocating resources to the
creditor classes in an orderly fashion." Under either Chapter, the
restructuring process provides a number of protections to the debtor, the
creditors, and the general public, including a provision to freeze the
11. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 721-27 (2012) (Chapter 7) (providing for liquidation of a
debtor's assets and distribution of proceeds to its creditors); id. at §§ 1 101-74 (Chapter 11)
(providing for reorganization of a debtor's business or personal affairs).
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metaphorical clock to evaluate and organize the estate. Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a), once a bankruptcy petition is filed, all entities are automatically
stayed from collecting, commencing, and continuing a litany of pre-petition
actions, including litigation.1 2 This stay is designed to "grant complete,
immediate, albeit temporary relief to the debtor from creditors, and also to
prevent dissipation of the debtor's assets before orderly distribution to
creditors can be effected.""
One exception to the automatic stay is the "police or regulatory power"
language in § 362(b)(4), which allows governmental units-such as
administrative agencies-to enforce their police powers.1 4 By creating the
exception, Congress responded to concerns that the automatic stay was
"particularly vulnerable to abuse by debtors improperly seeking refuge
under the stay in an effort to frustrate necessary governmental functions." 5
The § 362(b)(4) exception is designed to apply "where a governmental unit
is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental
protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws,
or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law ... ."16 Legislative
history indicates that the provision is to be "narrowly construed" to guard
public health and safety, and should "not apply to actions by a
governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor
or property of the estate."' 7
Unlike instances of public safety concerns, police power enforcement is
not allowed under § 362(b)(4) for the collection of "money judgment[s]." 8
Thus, bankruptcy courts must decide whether an agency's actions are more
like a collection effort, which should not qualify under § 362(b)(4), or
instead are actions to protect the public. To evaluate whether an action
falls within the police or regulatory power exception, courts often look to

12. Id. at § 362(a) (describing scenarios subject to the automatic stay when a debtor files
for bankruptcy protection).

13.
14.

Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't ofEnvd. Res. ofPa., 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984).
NLRB v. Cont'1 Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1991) ("There is

widespread agreement among the circuits that the

[NLRB]

and other Congressionally

established administrative agencies fall within the category of a governmental unit.").

15. United States v. Nicolet, Inc. (Nicolet 1), 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Rath Packing Co., 37 B.R. 614,
616-17 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1984) ("The exclusive authority of [the agency] to enforce federal
law and policy against discrimination would be obstructed by the escape mechanism that

§ 362(a) would provide if [agency] enforcement actions would be stayed on the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.").
16. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 342 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299.
17. Apex Oil Co. v. Dep't of Energy (DOE) (In re Apex Oil Co.), 91 B.R. 860, 863
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 549).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2012).
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either of two tests. First, the "pecuniary purpose test" asks whether the
government action relates primarily to a "pecuniary interest in the debtor's
property"-an action not excepted under § 362(b)(4) and, therefore, subject
to the automatic stay or, to matters of the public's "general safety and
welfare," which are excepted and therefore not subject to the automatic
stay.1 9 When the agency is acting as "little more than a surrogate to
enforce contract, tort, or wage claims against the Debtor," its claims should
not gain preferential treatment through an exception to the automatic
stay. 20 The second test, called the "public policy test, distinguishes between
proceedings that effectuate public policy and those that adjudicate private
rights: only the former are excepted from the automatic stay." 21
Bankruptcy courts addressing this issue focus on the difference between
entry of judgment, which they hold does not conflict with protections of the
automatic stay, and enforcement of that judgment, which they have decided is
an established violation of the stay.22 When an agency enters judgment
against a bankrupt corporation for regulatory violations, its actions serve
the desired deterrent purpose against other regulated parties.2 3

19. SeeNicoletl 857 F.2d at 209.
20. In re Bennett Paper Corp., 63 B.R. 8, 11-12 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that
an EEOC action to "make whole" all parties affected by employment discrimination was
subject to automatic stay because the purpose of the enforcement was "to protect a
pecuniary interest in the debtor's property" and not to enforce laws affecting "health,
welfare, morals and safety").
21. NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Herr v. Maine (In re Herr), 28 B.R. 465, 468
(Bankr. D. Me. 1983)); see also Burns v. Burns (In re Burns), No. 5 bk-07-50140 RNO, 2008
WL 3246244, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) ("In this case, the Attorney General, as part of
its mandate to ensure consumer protection, is seeking restitution not only to assist those who
were allegedly harmed by the Debtor's conduct, but also to fulfill the broader goal of
protecting the public at large from unsavory practices.").
22. See In re Burns, 2008 WL 3246244, at *4 ("Even if such enforcement of the
judgment is prevented by the automatic stay, the government can still pursue the claim to
the point of the entry of a money judgment, without violating the automatic stay."); In re
UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 444, 455 (7th Cir. 2006) ("What the [parties] are entitled to is not full
payment but an unsecured claim equal to the value of these benefits."); Illinois v. Elec. Utils.,
41 B.R. 874, 877 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Congress allows governmental units to get money
judgments in pursuit of their police power, but forces them to wait in line like all other
creditors to get the judgment enforced.").
23. See Apex Oil Co. v. United States (In re Apex Oil Co.), 91 B.R. 860, 864 (Bankr.
E.D. Miss. 1988) ("Even a penalizing proceeding might be considered a police and
regulatory activity due to its deterrent effect ... ); see also Hunt v. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) (In re Hunt), 93 B.R. 484, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Tx. 1988)
(emphasis added) ("The civil monetary penalties assessed by the CFTC are not in the nature
of a recovery of pecuniary loss; rather, they are remedial in nature and are imposed as a
deterrent to violation of the [CommoditiesExchange Act]. .").
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Additionally, unlike enforcement actions, the agency's entry of judgment
"will not interfere with the bankruptcy court's control of the bankruptcy
estate." 24 In contrast, allowing agencies to enforce monetary judgments
"would give the governmental unit an unfair advantage over other
creditors, would effectively subvert the scheme of priorities set forth in
§ 507, and would deny to the debtor the benefits of discharge."25 Even if
some marginal deterrent value were to come from enforcing monetary
judgments, the corresponding damage to the bankruptcy priority scheme
weighs against permitting such behavior. Thus, bankruptcy courts
adjudicating the propriety of agency collection efforts conclude that such
actions fall outside the scope of the police and regulatory power exception.
Even agencies in their internal adjudications recognize that their
jurisdiction to recover funds is not subject to similar protections and "are
for the district court as a matter ofjudgment execution." 26
Administrative agencies have standing as a creditor in bankruptcy cases
when they act as an "appointed statutory enforcer" of a federal law.2 7
While the police and regulatory power exception allows some agency
actions to avoid the automatic stay, in large part their claims are reduced to
the type held by members of the general class of creditors.28 As discussed
above, an agency's unsecured claims are frequently not paid in full and
instead receive only a pro-rata portion of the remaining value of the estate
24. EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 37 B.R. 614, 617 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1984). But see In re
Hunt, 93 B.R. at 495-98 (temporarily enjoining a CFTC proceeding to impose civil
monetary penalties to prevent the "irreparable harm" that would accompany parallel
proceedings, including litigation costs and disruption of the Chapter 11 proceeding).
25. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 362.05 [5] [b] (Alan N. Resnick & HenryJ. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010).
26. Hwang v. Bull Mkt. Commodities, Inc., CFTC No. 82-R505, 1987 WL 106866, at
*3 (CFTC July 7, 1987). Though the Code clearly states that monetary enforcement of a
penalty is not exempted from the stay and must be accomplished through the Bankruptcy
Court, NLRB v. Cont'l Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 835 (9th Cir. 1991), in rare instances
the estate is obligated to make payments. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Pa.
Human Rel. Comm'n (In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 63 B.R. 641, 644 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1986) (distinguishing "back to work" pay as a valid police power exception
because it is monetary expense to prevent future harm, not remedy past harm);
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. U.S. Envd. Prot. Agency (EPA) (In re Commonwealth Oil
Ref. Co.), 805 F.2d 1175, 1183-84 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing the EPA enforcement actions
under the police and regulatory exception, "notwithstanding the fact that [the regulated
party] will be forced to expend funds in order to comply [with environmental
requirements]").
27. See Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Cross (In re Cross), 218 B.R. 76, 79 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998)
(listing cases that also assign creditor status to regulatory bodies tasked with enforcing federal
statutory obligations).
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2012) (categorizing most government claims as category
eight priority unsecured claims).
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according to the priority structure set forth in § 507 of the Code.29 Unlike
other unsecured creditors, however, agencies have regulatory tools that can
help maximize the amount of recovery on their debts. For example,
agencies may have the regulatory authority to collect their debts in
administrative proceedings-even if the automatic stay would prevent the
agency from doing so within the related bankruptcy case.
Faced with the choice between standing in line with other unsecured
creditors for partial recovery and taking the opportunity to collect debts in
full, case law indicates that agencies adopt shapeshifting measures that
maximize their collection value.30 Such actions are not fundamentally
illegal. After all, Congress enabled agencies like the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) to conduct their
own proceedings, and no current provision of the Code prevents such
actions. 3' However, when agencies adopt shapeshifting behavior solely to
avoid creditor status, the analysis must change. The same reasoning that
supports a carve-out for collection efforts from the police and regulatory
power exception to the automatic stay also justifies a similar distinction in
the case of shapeshifting behavior.32
This is because Chapter 11
shapeshifters threaten the equitable distribution of the estate by collecting
greater sums than they would otherwise receive, all with no apparent
regulatory end. Once agencies are acting for their own pecuniary benefit,
their actions no longer fall within the intended scope of authority granted
by Congress. Accordingly, their actions should not be reviewed under the
same standard of deference. To better explain the circumstances that pose
the greatest problems, the next Section discusses one example of a
shapeshifting agency that evaded the bankruptcy process. That Section
then evaluates unsettled questions left by the Supreme Court.
B. EstablishedGroundwork and Open Questions: NextWave and Beyond
The Supreme Court's most recent instruction on the struggle between
administrative agencies and the restructuring process offered partial clarity

29.
30.

Id.
See, e.g., In re Telseven, LLC, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 6636, 6649-50 June 14, 2012)

(piercing the corporate veil to affix an insolvent company's liability onto the individual
owner, instead of pursuing the claim as a creditor in the company's concurrent bankruptcy
proceeding).

31.

See, e.g., 47

USC

§§ 503(b)(3)(A)-(B)

(2012) (outlining procedure for FCC

administrative forfeiture actions).
32. See infra Part II (outlining "shapeshifting" as an agency's transition between creditor
and regulator status in related proceedings or an agency simultaneously acting as creditor
and regulator within a single case).
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by firmly prohibiting one form of agency shapeshifting.33 Yet, due to the
limited factual circumstances the Court was asked to evaluate, the opinion
left ongoing uncertainty about whether other forms of shapeshifting
behavior will be similarly prohibited. 34 In 2003, the Supreme Court was
asked in a watershed case to address a conflict between the Code's
protection against cancellation of a debtor's licenses and the FCC
procedure to revoke telecommunications licenses due to non-payment. In
FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications,35 the FCC cancelled NextWave's
broadband personal communications service (PCS) licenses after NextWave
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The FCC was originally a
creditor within the bankruptcy case and challenged the bankruptcy court's
treatment and classification of the FCC's claim over the PCS licenses. 36
After successfully litigating a fraudulent conveyance adversary proceeding,
the FCC next challenged a proposed plan of confirmation in the
bankruptcy case. 37 Around the same time, the agency revoked NextWave's
PCS licenses-a valuable part of the estate-and advertised them for reauction in a concurrent FCC proceeding.38 NextWave challenged the
FCC's cancellation, and on appeal the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit found that the cancellation violated § 525 of the Code.39 Because
the APA requires agency actions to be "in accordance with law," the court
concluded that the FCC's cancellation was an invalid agency action. 40 On
appeal, without explicitly addressing the FCC's shapeshifting behavior, the
Supreme Court rested its decision on the Code's blanket prohibition on
license cancellation that is "solely" due to debtor licensee's unpaid
dischargeable debts. 41 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained that
§ 525 of the Code blocked the FCC's cancellation action. 42 Nothing in the
Communications Act of 1934, the FCC's enabling statute, requires
cancellation as a response to non-payment. 43 Thus, the FCC offered no
valid regulatory justification or conflict that would excuse its noncompliance with § 525.
The FCC's action in NextWave was an explicit example of Chapter 11
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
Id. at 295 (explaining the specific facts and issue before the Court).
Id. at 297-99.
See id. at 298.
Id. at 298-99.
Id.
Id. at 299.
See id. at 300 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)).
Id. at 300-01 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2012)).
See id. at 304.
Id. See generally Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-61(2012)).
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shapeshifting: the Commission initially participated in the bankruptcy case,
and then shifted its role from creditor to regulator by cancelling the licenses
instead of retaining a security interest in their value. The FCC's ability to
cancel and re-auction licenses offered an efficient and unencumbered path
to regain as much money as possible, unlike the FCC's alternative option to
remain as a low-priority creditor in the bankruptcy case. Though the
Supreme Court's holding refused to consider the FCC's reasons for
cancelling the licenses-it explained that such motives are "irrelevant" in
light of § 525's plain meaning the NextWave Court recognized that one
potential motive behind the FCC's cancellation was "making itself
financially whole." 44
Next Wave should serve as a warning for future conflict between the
bankruptcy process and an agency's self-interested motivation to maximize
collection of its debts. Though the obvious impact of NextWave was to check
the FCC's shapeshifting behavior, the underbelly of the holding projects
that future cases may not provide a similar check in the absence of a
similarly explicit provision in the Code. In the aftermath of Next Wave,
certain types of discriminatory regulatory actions are prohibited by the
Code's provisions; however, situations involving similar shapeshifting
behavior remain untested by the Court. For example, an agency cannot
cancel or revoke a license as a result of non-payment to re-auction it-the
exact circumstances in NextWave-due to § 525's prohibition. 45 Assuming,
as the Next Wave Court did, that the agency's motive is to avoid creditor
status and find an efficient way to collect its debts, several maneuvers
remain available.
One shapeshifiting possibility that allows an agency to benefit its own
pecuniary interest is to pierce the corporate veil and attach a debtor
corporation's liability to an individual who is beyond the protection of the
automatic stay. The FCC has previously acknowledged the possibility that
the Commission will pierce the corporate veil to attach licensee installment
46
Though we know
payment debt to a new party to the licensing entity.

44. NextWave, 537 U.S. at 301.
45. Id. at 298, 299, 304 (explaining the FCC's position that NextWave's licenses were
"canceled automatically" and "available for auction" to other parties, and then rejecting
that position in light of § 525).
46. In re Amend. of Part 1 of the Comm'ns Rules, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 21520, 15313 (FCC
Aug. 14, 2000) (Competitive Bidding Procedures). Though this FCC rulemaking is an
abstract statement without application guidance, it poses another interesting twist.
Assuming that veil-piercing for the purpose of proper license assignment falls under the
traditionally-protected regulatory reach of the FCC, extending debt liability for installment
payment participation does not necessarily carry the same public policy incentive for
deference when looking behind the corporate form. Regulating proper license control is not
automatically connected with ensuring the payment of installment debt. The latter action
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that discriminatory license cancellation is barred by § 525 of the Code, in
the absence of a similar provision addressing attachment of license debt, it
is an open question whether the Court would allow shapeshifting through
piercing the corporate veil. Like the revocation of NextWave's licenses,
veil-piercing behavior results in a similar circumvention of the Code's
automatic stay and preference payment provisions. 47 Yet, NextWave was not
decided on those grounds. We are left to wonder whether the Supreme
Court would reject shapeshifting behavior solely due to its impact on the
equitable distribution of a bankruptcy estate.
A second shapeshifting scenario that remains unchecked by NextWave's
holding involves an agency acting as both regulator and creditor in a single
case. As explained in detail below, the Second Thursday doctrine allows the
FCC to transfer telecommunications licenses through an expedited process
in bankruptcy. The Next Wave Court prohibited selective revocation of
licenses, but did not reach the issue of granting licenses. 48 Yet, when the
FCC is sitting in a position to approve or deny the transfer of a bankrupt
corporation's licenses, a similar tension with § 525 exists. 49 Challengers to
§ 525's prohibition suggest that "there ought to be an exception" in the case
of "a valid regulatory purpose." 50 Even assuming, arguendo, that a validregulatory-purpose exception exists, it should disappear when the agency is
a creditor while simultaneously sitting in judgment of license grants-a
shapeshifting scenario discussed in Part II.
II. AGENCY SHAPESHIFTING SCENARIOS
A. Administrative Shapeshifting and the Corporate Veil
1. Veil-Piercing Uncertainty and Application to Agencies
One way that administrative agencies shapeshift to maximize recovery of
their debts is through piercing the veil of a debtor corporation.
Administrative agencies express a willingness to pierce the corporate veil to
collect debts that would otherwise be subject to the Code's automatic stay.
Instead of embracing their role as creditors, veil-piercing agencies
more closely parallels traditional contract disputes, and should not fall under the police and
regulatory power exceptions to the automatic stay.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
48. SeeNextWave, 537 U.S. at 304.
49. It could be argued that, by refusing to approve the license transfer to the debtor's
selected bidder, the FCC is "deny[ing]" or "condition[ing] such a grant to ... another
person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been associated" in violation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 525.
50. NextWave, 537 U.S. at 302.
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shapeshift and use their regulatory authority to attach the same debt they
would hold as creditors to an individual behind the corporation. This
would be worrisome enough if it occurred within the bankruptcy case; yet,
agency veil-piercing is most commonly done in a concurrent agency
enforcement proceeding. 5' To better understand the threat posed by
agency veil-piercing, this Section will continue in three parts. First, it will
explain the origins of piercing the corporate veil and discuss why veilpiercing is generally an uncertain concept. Next, it will highlight additional
complexities that are introduced in the specific context of administrative
veil-piercing. This includes uncertainty about whether administrative
agencies have the authority to engage in veil-piercing behavior, as well as
the different standards that agencies employ to determine when veilpiercing is appropriate. Finally, this Section discusses alternatives agencies
have used to mirror piercing the corporate veil. Such actions should also
be considered in any possible solution to shapeshifting behavior.
a. Origins ofPiercing the Corporate Veil
Incorporated entities benefit from a number of protections, including the
well-established reverence for the corporate form as a liability shield for the
individuals behind it. The "corporate veil" serves a number of purposes,
including "encouraging risk taking by individual investors as well as overall
convenience of financial administration." 5 2 The doctrine of veil-piercing
involves an exception to the general corporate form where "courts
disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a shareholder
responsible for the corporation's action as if it were the shareholder's
own." 53 Though incorporation is designed in part to limit liability, "it is not
enough to simply have the requisite papers for incorporation drawn up and
filed. The entity must thenfunction as a corporation infact." 54
Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy at its core, seeking to
redress harms that would otherwise be unenforceable against a
corporation.55 It is often described as an extraordinary action that should
only be "undertake[n] reluctantly": "There is a presumption of corporate
51. For example, the FCC pierced the corporate veil of a Telseven-regulated company
in a parallel FCC proceeding after the same company filed for Chapter 7 protection in
bankruptcy court. See discussion infia Part II.
52. Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036, 1036 (1991).
54. In re Safe & Sure Prods., Inc., No. I.F. & R. 04-907003-C, 1998 WL 422206, at *20
(EPAjune, 26 1998).
55. See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (2015)
(discussing the equitable origins of veil-piercing).
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regularity which usually requires the party seeking to have the corporate
entity disregarded to come forward with a substantial showing that the
corporation was really a dummy for the person sought to be held liable."5

6

At a fundamental level, the focus of a veil-piercing evaluation is that
"corporateness will not be recognized to produce unjust or undesirable
consequences inconsistent with the purpose of the concept."5 7 Not
surprisingly, this commonsense objective provides little guidance for
crafting a concrete standard, perhaps an underlying reason that veilpiercing is among the most litigated issues in corporate law.5 8
The corporate veil-piercing doctrine developed from several underlying
equitable theories, leading to many formations of a veil-piercing standard.
Frederick

J.

Powell developed the most prominent test,5 9 involving a three-

part analysis that is "perhaps the most frequently applied and most clearly
articulated of the rules in the corporate veil area. . . ."6o The test evaluates:
(1) an "alter-ego," or "mere instrumentality" test, requiring that the
subsidiary be completely under the control and domination of the parent;
(2) the "fraud or wrong" or "injustice" test, requiring that the defendantparent's conduct in using the subsidiary to have been somehow unjust,
fraudulent, or wrongful toward the plaintiff and (3) the "unjust loss or
injury" test, requiring the plaintiff actually to have suffered some harm as a
result of the defendant parent.6' These factors form the foundation of
many veil-piercing standards, yet rampant modification was a common
practice throughout the doctrine's development. Due to uncertain
standards and divergent motivations, the fiction of limited liability and the
proper role of piercing the corporate veil have been called "a legal
quagmire," 62 and described as "enveloped in the mists of metaphor." 63

56. Pardo v. Wilson Line of Wash., Inc., 414 F.2d 1145, 1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see
John H. Matheson, My Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7
BERKELEY Bus. LJ. 1 (2010) (discussing the basic incentives of veil-piercing).
57.
Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises § 146, at 344 (3d ed. 1983).
58. See PRESSER, supra note 55, at 8 ("Any brief perusal of the state or federal reporters
shows as many corporation law cases on piercing the veil as those devoted to any other issue,
and occasionally more than the other various issues combined."); see generally Thompson,
supra note 53.
59. See FREDRICKJ. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 1-10 (1931)
("Underlying Theory of Parent Corporation's Liability; The Three Elements").
60. Cathy S. Krendl &James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquir, 55
DENY. LJ. 1, 13 (1978).
61. POWELL, supra note 59, at 5-9.
62. Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiay Corporations, 14 CAL. L.
REV. 12, 15 (1925).
63. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo,J.).
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As lamented by noted veil-piercing scholar Steven Presser, "There has
been a real reluctance on the part of courts clearly to define piercing the
veil standards."

64

The standards are "like lightning . . . rare, severe, and

unprincipled"; evaluating limited liability and piercing the corporate veil is
"among the most confusing in corporate law." 65 State courts are far from
uniform in their veil-piercing analysis, and a parallel federal veil-piercing
system has developed, creating a web of competing approaches. Federal
courts often adopt a "federal common law" standard that "allows for more
easy piercing of the corporate veil than does comparable state law." 66
Courts have held that litigation involving "federal interests" leads to a
"more liberal" standard of veil-piercing than in traditional state claims. 6 7

Because the adoption has been piecemeal, federal veil-piercing standards
seem to be "an even more confused and chaotic form than state law," and
"mastering its complexities will be a daunting test for lawyers in the years to
come." 68 In United States v. Bestfoods, 69 the Supreme Court unanimously
declined to enter the fray to resolve the choice of law concern, leaving the
topic subject to "heated debate in the Circuit and District Courts";7 0

'

subsequent cases have not provided additional clarity.7
b. Agency Veil-Piercing:Authoriy and Standards

Agency veil-piercing builds upon the doctrine's general uncertainty in
two ways. First, no authority firmly establishes that agencies are entitled to
pierce the corporate veil in administrative proceedings. Courts have found
64.

PRESSER, supra note 55, at 8.

65. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).
66. PRESSER, supra note 55, at 927.
67. In re Capitol Hill Healthcare Grp., 242 B.R. 199, 203 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1999) (listing
cases and noting the frequency of "liberal veil-piercing" in regulatory contexts).
68.

PRESSER, supra note 55, at 928.

69. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
70. Id.; PRESSER, supra note 55, at 949 (addressing the open choice between state veilpiercing law from the place of incorporation or significant contacts, or federal common law
standards and discussing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51).
7 1. One example of the heated debate in veil-piercing doctrine is the ongoing conflict
between state and federal standards. Federal standard advocates attribute the inapplicability
of state veil-piercing standards to divergent underlying incentives. States developed the
corporate shield "to encourage the formation and use of capital," leading to "rather
stringent limitations" on veil-piercing to remove the shield, Lloyd Myers Co., 51 Agric. Dec.
747 (USDA Mar. 27, 1992), while federal law and agencies intend to "regulate interstate
commerce and to control and outroot some evil practices in it," focusing less on the
"refinements of common-law definitions" when determining how an agency's power to
accomplish its Congressional directives. Goodman v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 244 F.2d 584,
590-91 (9th Cir. 1957).

248

ADMINISTRATIVE

LA WREVIEW

[68:2

that an agency "cannot be prevented from regulating within its proper
domain by the creation of paper entities; it can pierce the corporate veil in
order to prevent frustration of its regulatory tasks." 72 An agency's ability to
pierce the veil for regulatory purposes, however, does not necessarily
include veil-piercing in enforcement actions. Some agencies assume the
authority to pierce the corporate veil without further analysis. Instead, they
proceed directly to the issue of what standard to apply. Other courts are
less convinced that federal standards automatically govern an
administrative veil-piercing situation,73 and some judges lament that the
concepts of limited liability "lose much of their sacrosanctity when urged in
the context of regulated industries."74 Other agency adjudicators choose to
avoid the action completely, suggesting that "piercing the corporate veil
generally should be reserved for proceedings to enforce a reparation award
in federal court." 75
Second, even assuming that agencies are able to pierce the corporate
veil, their varying approaches to veil-piercing further complicate the
doctrine. The wide variety of agency veil-piercing standards indicates that
each agency adheres to a slightly different flavor of the traditional common
law rule. 76 Agencies that look to pierce the corporate veil under "federal

72.

N. Am. Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis

added).

&

73. See Chao v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 401 F.3d 355, 365
n.3 (5th Cir. 2005) ("We provide no discussion of whether state or federal alter ego law
applies in this administrative case not arising under diversity jurisdiction.").
74. Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75. Boring v. Apache Trading Co., CFTC No. 88-R30, 1992 WL 212380, at *8 n.25
(CFTC Aug. 27, 1992) (vacating the ALJ's conclusions without prejudice to "raise the
[corporate veil] theory in the appropriate forum").
76. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.L. Lines, Ltd. v. Global Link Logistics, Inc., No. 09-01, 2011
WL 7144008, at *25 (FMC Aug. 1, 2011) (quoting Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982,
985 (2d Cir. 1980) (providing that under federal maritime law "the individual must have
used the corporate entity to perpetuate a fraud or have so dominated and disregarded the
corporate entity's corporate form that the corporate entity primarily transacted the
individual's personal business rather than its own corporate business"); NLRB v. BolivarTees, Inc., 551 F.3d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 2008) ("We have adopted the following two-prong
test as the 'federal common law' standard .... "); In re Safe & Sure Prods., Inc., No. I.F.
R. 04-907003-C, 1998 WL 422206, at *18-19 (EPA June 26, 1998) (adopting the NLRB
two-prong standard for the EPA); In re Midland Banana & Tomato Co., 54 Agric. Dec.
1239, 1995 WL 493881, at *17 (USDA Aug. 16, 1995) ("The [U.S. Department of
Agriculture] examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding the violation rather than
the form of the business entity involved in order to effectuate the purposes of the statutes it
administers."); Pel-Star Energy, Inc., 65 FERC P 61079, 61502-03 (1993) ("The
Commission identified two primary questions in determining whether an individual should
be personally liable: (1) is there such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the controlling individual no longer exist and (2) will
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regulatory statutes" tend to eschew state standards.77 In response to
litigants who assert that specific state corporation law provisions could
prevent federal veil-piercing action, administrative courts swiftly note that a
state "statute would not trump federal law on the subject." 78 Beyond the
question of state versus federal common law veil-piercing standards, other
agencies create their own tests to determine when piercing the veil is
appropriate. For example, some agency veil-piercing standards require "a
showing of improper conduct," 79 while others explicitly reject
the
evaluation of willfulness or fraud.80 Still others focus on use of the
corporate form to avoid statutory purposes. 8' Commentators have
suggested that agency-specific precedents are the result of a "deliberate
strategy" to develop a preferential approach to the veil-piercing doctrine.82
adherence to the corporate fiction or the failure to disregard the corporate form result in
fraud or injustice"); Pickett v. Traders Int'l, Inc., CFTC No. 83-R189, 1986 WL 66150, at
*2 (CFTC Sept. 22, 1986) (listing "some of the factors considered [by the CFTC] in piercing
the corporate veil").
77. Sebastopol Meat Co. v. Sec'y of Agric., 440 F.2d 983, 984-86 (9th Cir. 1971)
(rejecting the idea that "state law limitations on the alter ego theory or doctrine are
necessarily controlling," and noting that the agency's order was "to insure that regulation
will not be thwarted by continued unlawful conduct" and "does not impose personal liability
upon [the individual] for past acts").
78. In re Frank Acierno Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, No. CWA-03-2005-0376, 2006
WL 3361629, at *13 (EPAJune 2006); see also Domsey Trading Corp., No. 29-CA-14548,
2011 WL 5868411, at *1 (NLRB Feb. 14, 2011) ("To the extent that [state] statutes or case
law may have a different standard for holding a corporation's shareholders personally liable,
that standard is not . . . applicable to cases litigated [within the NLRB] . . . ."); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. O'Brien Mktg., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1995) ("The
Court concludes that federal common law, rather than state law, applies to the issue of
piercing the corporate veil in these [FCC] proceedings.
79. Bolivar-Tees, 551 F.3d at 727.
80. Pel-StarEnergy, 52 FERC at 65019 ("Willfulness and fraud are simply not part of the
test for piercing the corporate veil.").
81. See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n
(FERC), 998 F.2d 1313, 1321 (5th Cir. 1993) (approving of FERC's veil-piercing because to
do otherwise "would frustrate a statutory purpose by allowing [the corporation] to set up
subsidiaries to sell gas at prices at which the company could not legally sell"); Town of
Highlands v. Natahala Power & Light Co., 19 FERC P 61152, 61276, 1982 WL 41323, at
*4 (1982) ("The central question to resolve here is whether a preponderance of the evidence
supports a finding that [a parent corporation] has used the separate corporate
identities ... to frustrate the purposes of the [federal statute].").
82. Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strateg?,
89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 91-92 (2011).
Rather, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least some of these attorneys are
aware of the differences between general and agency-specific precedents yet decline to
bring them to the attention of the courts. Instead, one might theorize that deliberate
strategy rather than rational ignorance explains why attorneys in at least some cases
ignore general administrative law doctrine in favor of agency-specific precedents in
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Further complicating the situation, regulatory bodies often use the common
law tests and terms interchangeably; for example, veil-piercing analysis
often shifts to a discussion of alter ego status without acknowledging any
distinction.83
c. Altematives to Agency Veil-Piercing
Perhaps due to uncertain veil-piercing standards, some agencies reach
the same result as veil-piercing through two alternative approaches. First,
in many instances Congress has drafted or modified the governing statutes
to contemplate individual liability, eliminating the need to rely on veilpiercing behavior. 84 In the landmark United States v. Bestfoods decision, the
Supreme Court held that "in order to abrogate a common-law principle

formulating their arguments .... Rational ignorance may apply in either case, but so
may deliberate strategy as clever attorneys utilize the precedents most favorable to
their clients' positions. In short, deviations between agency-specific precedents and
general administrative law norms likely arise from many sources and develop in
multiple ways.

Id.
83. See, e.g., In re Capitol Hill Healthcare Grp., 242 B.R. 199, 203 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1999)
("Treating a corporation as the alter ego of another entity is the same thing as piercing the
corporate veil: it comes down to disregarding the corporation's separate existence.").
84. See, e.g., In re FRM Chem, Inc., No. FIFRA-07-2008-0035, 2010 WL 2470252, at
*10 (EPA May 27, 2010) ("It is clear that individual corporate officers and shareholders may
properly be charged with individual FIFRA liability. . . ."); In re Frank Acierno Christiana
Town Ctr., LLC, No. CWA-03-2005-0376, 2006 WL 3361629, at *12 (EPA June 2006)
(concluding that "it is unnecessary to 'pierce the corporate veil"' to hold an individual liable
when the facts lead to individual liability); In re Coast Wood Preserving, Inc., 2003 WL
21213226, at *2 (EAB 2003) (refusing to superimpose a veil-piercing analysis onto clear
statutory aggregation policies under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2012)); Bannistor v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394, 407-08 (5th Cir.
2002) (finding bankruptcy court's independent analysis of individual appellants
"unnecessary" due to statutory definitions under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)); McDowell v. Krawchison, 125 F.3d
954, 963 n.Il (6th Cir. 1997) ("Because we hold that Krawchison was directly liable as the
plan administrator . . . we need not address the district court's veil-piercing analysis.");
Monieson v. CFTC, 996 F.2d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing to limit § 13(b) of the
Commodity Exchange Act to the "alter ego situation" because Congress "would have been
more specific" if it wanted to limit the statute); Pupillo v. United States, 755 F.2d 638, 643
(8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the piercing analysis was not warranted, in part due to the per
se
liability
under
the
Perishable
Agricultural
Commodities
Act
(PACA),
7 U.S.C. § 499a(b)(9) (2012)). But see Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(piercing the corporate veil despite statutory definitions and text because "nothing in the
legislative history . .. suggests that the Secretary [of Agriculture] is powerless ...

to apply a

doctrine commonplace in judicial decision-making .... Section (1)(9) [of PACA] is not so
all-inclusive . . . as to negate the normal function of administrative interpretation of its
terminology.").
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[veil-piercing], the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by
the common law." 85 This opinion reinforced the protections of the
corporate form, but also established "an equally important proposition, that
Congress may legislate direct accountability for persons involved in an
enterprise." 8 6
Absent individual liability provisions in the governing statute, an agency
may also mirror piercing the veil by categorizing its behavior under
alternate theories. Under this approach, an agency can re-classify an action
that would otherwise be called veil-piercing, creating a fiction
of
terminology just to avoid the doctrine's restraints. For example, in the
FCC's declaratory ruling that led to the ICO Global Communications, Ltd.
(ICO) litigation, the Commission insisted that they were evaluating
"enterprise liability" instead of piercing the veil when they considered
attaching liability to a parent entity.87 Perhaps under certain factual
scenarios, a valid distinction exists between veil-piercing to find an
individual parent liable (our traditional understanding of piercing the
corporate veil) and enterprise liability for a parent's own participation in a
corporate enterprise. However, the FCC's "enterprise liability" analysis in
ICO is in effect no different than veil-piercing; liability was attached to the
parent only when its subsidiary was unable to pay debts and filed for
bankruptcy protection.8 8 Beyond the FCC's conclusory assertion that
enterprise liability is a different doctrine, no evidence supports a distinction
from traditional veil-piercing as applied in ICO. An agency that reclassifies its veil-piercing actions should be subject to the same limitations
on veil-piercing discussed in Part IV of this Article, so it is worthwhile to
bring attention to this additional layer of shapeshifting behavior.8 9

85. 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
86. Coast Wood Preseming, 2003 WL 21213226, at *12.
87. In re Improving Pub. Safety Commc'ns in the 800 MHZ Band, 25 F.C.C. Rcd.
13,874, 13,892, 13,889 (FCC Sept. 29, 2010).
Although the presence of the factors supporting veil piercing or an alter ego finding
can also be relevant to determining enterprise liability, enterprise liability does not
seek to make a parent corporation liable for the actions of its subsidiary, but rather
recognizes in appropriate cases that the parent is liable for its own actions as part of
the overall enterprise that it has created and operated.
Id. at 13,889 (first emphasis added).
88. Id. at 13, 889, 13,891-92.
89. Because agency behavior that mirrors veil-piercing is challenging to identify, such
behavior is even more difficult to stop. It is possible that the additional checks on veilpiercing agency behavior for which I advocate in Part IV of this Article will encourage
agencies to turn instead to informal veil-piercing. Though a solution designed for informal
veil-piercing is beyond the scope of this Article, I nonetheless suspect that the same solutions
can apply once bankruptcy courts, litigants, and Congress are aware of the risk that such
shapeshifting can pose.
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So long as agencies have uncertain guidance as to the appropriate veilpiercing analysis, they have the opportunity to develop standards selectively
that most effectuate their unique incentives. Because the field is
fundamentally mired, it seems unlikely that a reviewing court would
evaluate and reject an inequitable variation of the veil-piercing analysis.
This uncertainty is especially relevant in bankruptcy cases where the stakes
are high. When agencies utilize their own flavor of veil-piercing to
shapeshift away from creditor status, it threatens an estate's value along
with the integrity of the bankruptcy process. The next Section categorizes
patterns of agency veil-piercing behavior to highlight the area of greatest
threat.
2. Agengy PiercingPatterns
The pattern of veil-piercing in administrative agencies can be distilled
down to a structure of objectives within the enforcement context. By
evaluating each agency's underlying purpose for piercing the corporate veil,
three distinct categories emerge to serve as the basis for discussing the need
to modify statutory provisions and deference standards.
First, agencies look beyond the corporate form in a number of cases in
the interest of public safety or to comply with the agency's policy directives.
For example, in one case involving the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission (FMSHRC), the veil of a corporation was pierced to
attach penalties and additional scrutiny to a responsible individual.90 The
regulations were designed to encourage safe mining environments, and
evidence indicated that the corporation's owners had fabricated their
insolvency to evade regulatory fines and obligations; they were already
operating other mines with similarly-dangerous practices.9 ' The FMSHRC
held that preserving the corporate veil "would merely further a scheme to
circumvent effective enforcement of the Mine Safety Law."9

2

Similarly, the

U.S. Department of Agriculture found that veil-piercing was necessary to
prevent an individual from violating the Packers and Stockyards Act" in a
subsequent livestock business, especially after the first entity was dissolved. 94
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration pierced the
90. Sec'y of Labor v. NBC Energy, Inc., 4 FMSHRC 1860, 1872, 1982 WL 176154, at
*4-5 (Oct. 22, 1982) ("Indeed, the fiction of a corporate entity must be disregarded whenever
it has been adopted or used to defeat a paramount public policy such as that designed for
protection of a vital national resource-the nation's miners.").
91. Id. at 1870-73.
92. Id. at 1871.
93. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229c (2012).
94. In re Trenton Livestock, Inc., 41 Agric. Dec. 1965, 1976, 1982 WL 37604, at *9-10

(USDA Oct. 27, 1982).
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corporate veil by combining an individual's previous violations with their
subsequent corporation, all to deter corporations from hiring people who
have violated the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.95
Similarly, the Department of Transportation looked behind the veil to
prevent continued evasion of Public Charter regulations. 96 Agencies also
pierce the corporate veil as a prerequisite to granting or revoking licenses,
looking to the full set of circumstances surrounding an applicant so as not to
frustrate the policy behind such regulation.97 In all cases of this kind,
including those explicitly discussed herein, agencies used veil-piercing to
protect the public and effectuate the purposes of their regulatory authority.
The second category of veil-piercing behavior involves restoring the state
of the world to a financial status quo. In such situations, the corporation
generally failed to meet some form of financial regulatory obligation, and in
an administrative proceeding the agency seeks to hold an individual98 liable
for restitution.99 In labor cases, the National Labor Relations Board often

95. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-84 (2012); In re Tampico, Inc., 7 O.R.W. 232, 236 n.2 (NOAA
July 9, 1993) ("Assessing penalties in this way, while apparently harsh, creates the proper
incentives for hiring within the industry: fishing companies are discouraged from having
directors who have previous fishery violations and captains [are] discouraged from
committing violations because the penalty assessed will reflect the corporation's second
violation, not his first."); see also In re Ad. Spray Corp., No. NE950010FM/V, 1997 WL
1402870, at *27-28 (NOAA Apr. 2, 1997) (recognizing the "substantial impact" of severe
penalties on the individual parties imposed through veil-piercing, but finding them "most
appropriate").
96. 14 C.F.R. pt. 380 (2015); see Robert 0. Nay, No. 45663, 1991 WL 247769, at *9
(DOT Nov. 18, 1991) ("The companies were created for the sole purpose of avoiding the
regulations concerning the operation of such charters and that disregarding the asserted
corporate identities in this case is necessary to prevent injustice through subversion of the
regulatory system for charter operations.").
97. See, e.g., Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 737-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(combining the individual and corporation for one radio frequency license application);
S.O.U.P., Inc. v. FTC, 449 F.2d 1142, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (piercing the veil to determine
whether it was reasonable to waive the corporation's filing fees in forma pauperis); Mansfield
Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (piercing the veil to deny separate
applications for radio station licenses because the entities were controlled by one family).
98. Though the focus of this Section is primarily directed at the pattern of piercing to
affix individual liability, a significant portion of veil cases involve parent-subsidiary
combinations where liability or obligations are attached to a corporate parent. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 65, at 110.
99. Repayment via veil-piercing is also encouraged by Article III courts, perhaps
because in such situations the public at large was harmed, not merely a government agency
or regulated corporation. See, e.g., Carpenters & Millwrights, Local Union 2471 v. NLRB,
481 F.3d 804, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating the NLRB's initial decision not to pierce the
corporate veil against individuals to collect money for a back pay order issued against the
"by-then defunct company" and remanding for further proceedings which, unsurprisingly,
resulted in veil-piercing).
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pierces the corporate veil to remedy back pay obligations that would likely
not be satisfied by the remaining corporate assets. 00 In another example of
"status quo" veil-piercing, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
looks to individuals to collect overcharges on crude oil in violation of
antilayering regulations.' 0 ' Status quo piercing results in financial
payments, yet the money does not merely go to the agency the funds may
be passed through to restore the injured party to the position they were
entitled to under federal law.
A third category of cases involves piercing the corporate veil to affix
penalties against a corporation to individuals, independent of an established
statutory purpose for such liability. Penalty piercing can be done by the
agency itself in an enforcement proceeding, 0 2 or alternatively by a
regulated party who is given authority to bring an individual action under
the agency's statutory grant. 0 3 The latter situation is not without potential
concerns, as the agency is approving veil-piercing in a case between two
private, albeit regulated, parties.1 04 In such a case, the agency could be
considered a "proxy" for purposes of veil-piercing, particularly if credence
is given to the concept of agency capture. 05 The agency can preference or

100. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bolivar-Tees, Inc., 551 F.3d 722, 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2008)
("Substantial evidence exists to support a finding that adherence to the corporate fiction
would sanction a fraud and lead to the evasion of a legal obligation."); Domsey Trading
Corp., No. 29-CA-14548, 2011 WL 5868411 (NLRB Feb. 14, 2011) ("To state the obvious,
this category of cases would not be litigated if the corporate entity or entities that had
incurred liabilities could pay the debts. It is only when the coffers are empty that one begins
to look elsewhere for payment."); Rome Elec. Sys., Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 38, at 178 (Nov.
24, 2010) (approving back pay obligations by individual respondent through veil-piercing
analysis).
101. See Pel-Star Energy, Inc. v. DOE, 890 F. Supp. 532, 543-44 (W.D. La. 1995)
(reversing veil-piercing due to improper analysis of the facts but reaffirming the validity of
overlooking the corporate form and determining the proper standard for the FERC).
102. See Ariel Mar. Grp., Inc., No. 84-38, 1987 WL 209051, at *18 (FMC Sept. 24,
1987) (holding an individual "jointly and severally liable for all of the civil penalties assessed
against the corporate respondents").
103. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. O'Brien Mktg., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1536, 1543-44 (S.D.
Fla. 1995) (allowing a regulated party to pierce the corporate veil to collect unpaid charges
for interstate telecommunication services against alter ego of defendant corporation).
104. See infia notes 115-118 (discussing agency jurisdiction over public, rather than
private, rights).
105. Mark C. Niles, On the Hiacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, "Agency Capture," and Airline Security, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER, Soc. POL'Y &L. 381,
390 (2002).
The phenomenon of capture has been variously defined, but proponents of the theory
have generally observed that capture occurs when a regulated entity . . . succeed[s],
through lobbying or other influential devices, in replacing what would otherwise be
the public-policy agenda of the agency with its own private and self-serving agenda.
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support one regulated party's interest to collect maximum funds, allowing
that party to unduly influence what should otherwise be a neutral
proceeding.
I suggest the greater risk lies where an agency itself pierces the corporate
veil. In that instance an administrative agency can point to regulatory
motives from its statutory scheme to support piercing the corporate veil and
affixing liability onto an individual, even if the agency has other (selfinterested) motivations for its actions. This becomes
even
more
problematic when the corporation is insolvent, because the integrity of the
bankruptcy system is at stake. In that circumstance, the agency can look to
veil-piercing to avoid its creditor status under the Code and collect its debts
in administrative proceedings. To be sure, in many instances the parties
that stand behind corporations have individual culpability; 06 however,
"outrage at [this] conduct should not obscure the boundaries of settled legal
categories." 0 7 It does not follow that the culpable individual should be
held fully liable, merely because an agency is unable to collect from an
insolvent corporation-"A corporation's inability to pay its debt alone is
not sufficient to support a finding of injustice." 08 Though it is possible that
the veil-piercing in such a hypothetical could be valid, I suggest that the
agency's incentives are tainted by the opportunity to act in self-interest to
maximize collection. Furthermore, any money that is collected through
veil-piercing against the culpable individual behind a bankrupt corporation
should supplement the estate, not an individual creditor.1 09

The distinction between category one and category three enforcement
veil-piercing can be easily blurred. While individual liability may be critical
to protect and effectuate a statutory purpose, agencies appear to invoke
their regulatory needs in cases in which no such need appears. In one

In other words, when a regulated entity succeeds at winning "the hearts and minds of
the regulators," regulation becomes "a method of subsidizing private interests at the
expense of the public good."
Id.
106. For example, the sole shareholder in Telseven was likely not an innocent victim. Yet,
once agencies show a willingness to evade their creditor status it is important to assume the
same behavior could be applied to less egregious facts.
107. Domsey Trading Corp., No. 29-CA-14548, 357 NLRB No. 180, 2011 WL
7080654, at *7 (Dec. 30, 2011) (Hayes, Memb., dissenting) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 60-61 (1991) KennedyJ., dissenting)).
108. NLRB v. Bolivar-Trees, Inc., 551 F.3d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing NLRB v.
Greater Kan. City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 1993)).
109. See In re Mass, 178 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1995) (ordering the turnover of
assets which were granted to a creditor via veil-piercing in a parallel proceeding, and noting
that its order pulling back the individual creditor's award "serves public policy by placing all
the assets in the same pot and all creditors on equal footing").
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example, the FCC pierced the corporate veil to affix significant penalties
against an individual owner of a bankrupt (and defunct) corporation, even
though the owner had no continuing involvement with the agency." 0 In In
re Telseven, LLC, the FCC attached approximately $1.75 million in penalties
against the sole owner and shareholder of a corporation because he
"apparently solely owns, controls, and manages Telseven . . . ."II The

Commission relied upon previous FCC precedent that governed licensing
procedures."1 2 However, unlike category one veil-piercing procedures that
focus on determining whether a regulated party poses an ongoing safety
threat or deserves a benefit, here, the Commission ignored the corporate
form to have a better chance to collect its debt. Implicitly acknowledging
the fact that veil-piercing was unnecessary, the Commission noted the
availability of individual liability under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1).11 3 However,
the Commission did not assign individual liability. There is no evidence in
the record that the individual did anything in violation of the
Communications Act. The FCC also required that, under § 1.80 of the
Commission's rules, the full amount of the proposed forfeitures must be
paid within thirty days, not mentioning the potential that collection of such
debt would be subject to the pending bankruptcy case. 114
In a subsequent Notice of Apparent Liability order, the FCC again
pierced the veil to affix another $1.7 million in enforcement penalties
against the individual owner. 115 The Commission noted that veil-piercing
can be done "even when the strict standards of common law alter ego
would not apply,""t 6 citing a list of cases where the Commission previously
looked through the corporate veil."t 7 Notably, each of the cited cases
involved either category one or two veil-piercing situations, protecting the

110.

In re Telseven, LLC, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 6636, 6649 June 14, 2012). The FCC applied

its own version of the veil-piercing test:
The

Commission may "pierce

the corporate veil" and

hold one entity or

individual liable for the acts or omissions of a different, related entity when: (1)
there is a

common identity of officers, directors or shareholders; (2) there is

common control between the entities; and (3) it is necessary to preserve

the

integrity of the Communications Act and to prevent the entities from defeating
the purpose and provisions of statutory provisions.

Id.
111.

Id. at 6650.

112.
113.

See id. at 6649-50.
Id.at6650.

114.

Id. at 6651; see generally Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy, In re Telseven, LLC, No.

3:12-bk-2682-PMG (Bankr. M.D. Fl. Apr. 20, 2012).
115. In re Telseven, LLC, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 15,558, 15,570 (Nov. 30, 2012).
116.
117.

Id. at 15,571
Id. at 15,571 n.101.
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public or restoring status quo through statutory directives."1 8 Though the
Telseven court mentioned the need to fulfill the statute, it never connects its
quest for individual liability to any statutory purpose. Without a clear
connection, such veil-piercing merely to avoid the automatic stay and
maximize the opportunity to collect is in significant tension with the
original design of regulatory agencies, not to mention the purposes of the
Code. Furthermore, the FCC's lax veil-piercing standard requires only
some degree of unity that any small corporation would have with its owner,
including a "statutory purpose" factor that could stretch to reach most
situations, which provided no additional guidance in Telseven.
Faced with concerning agency behavior, litigants could challenge
category three veil-piercing by questioning the agency's authority to act.
Congress grants the scope of jurisdiction in the agency's organic act.119
Statutory language can drastically shape the power of an agency through
specific provisions,1 20 yet often the absence of explicit limits can also be the
source of authority.121 Administrative agencies have jurisdiction to hear
cases that would otherwise be subject to exclusive jurisdiction in Article III
federal courts under a number of theories, including the idea that they may
decide cases involving so-called "public rights." 22 Some opinions have
dismissed the public-private distinction when faced with a challenge to

118.

See id. (discussing regulatory veil-piercing cases looking to award licenses and

apportion quotas, not affix penalties).
119.

See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive

Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2169 (2004).
Under the exclusive

delegation interpretation

of Article I, Section

1,

agencies

generally should be denied authority to act with the force of law unless Congress has
delegated such power to them. This entails two subsidiary inquiries: (1) Has Congress
delegated legislative

power to the agency?

and (2) What is the

scope of this

delegation? The first is a question of agency power; the second is a question of
agency jurisdiction.

Id. at 2169.
120. See, e.g., Rapaport v. U.S. Dep't. of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(rejecting the

agency's enforcement action

in an administrative proceeding "where

the

safeguards and standards appurtenant to Article III courts apply" because Congress "simply
a suit in district court under 12 U.S.C. § 93 [(2012)];" to

made their remedy of choice ...

interpret 12 U.S.C. § 1818 otherwise "is in effect an unlimited reading of a statute upon
which the Congress intended to place a limit").
12 1. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron

Deference, Agency

Jurisdiction, and

Statutor Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1505-07 (2009)

(examining the challenges posed by evaluating agency jurisdiction).
122. For a description of the line of cases that develop the "public rights" theory, see

Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65-71 (1989) (Scalia,

J.,

concurring); see also

Thomas W. Merrill, Article I7, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of

Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 981-87 (2011) (discussing the adjunct and
public right theories of authority).
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agency jurisdiction in individual penalty enforcement cases. 123 Even
assuming the distinction applies, agency jurisdiction should not extend to
category three veil-piercing because agencies are acting ultra vires, or
beyond their authority thus, not involving a public right.1 24 However, if
courts continue to interpret the public rights doctrine broadly or if the
concept of ancillary jurisdiction extends to enforcement action, 25 the
challenge to agency jurisdiction may fail and Article III courts currently
have little choice but to extend established principles of deference when
evaluating appeals of agency actions.
The act of administrative veil-piercing is well established and generally
correlates with one of three basic objectives. I suggest that the first two
objectives, returning to the status quo and preventing or remedying a
public policy risk that the agency was tasked to regulate, are unproblematic
uses of the veil-piercing doctrine. In each of these categories the agency is
acting in the interest of the public to remedy or prevent harm in line with
its statutory directive, and therefore there is no urgent need to deviate from
the established administrative deference system. In contrast, the third
category of veil-piercing objectives merits additional scrutiny. Actions
designed to penalize corporations and, subsequently, the individuals behind
the corporate veil, should not be automatically extended in any context.
Though enforcement penalties serve a deterrent purpose, the pressing need
for affixing and collecting penalties against individuals does not always
serve that same purpose.

123.

See, e.g., Pel-Star Energy, Inc., 52 FERC P 63,006, 65014-15 (FERCJuly 26, 1990).

124. This is similar to the argument against extending established deference standards to
agencies actng for their own financial benefit and arguably no longer for their public
policy statutory purpose.
125.

One possible counterpoint to this argument is that an agency's so-called "ancillary

jurisdiction" can extend to this very circumstance because individual enforcement
proceedings are closely related to other agency actions. FLEMINGJAMES,JR. & GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD,JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.7, at 61-62 (3d ed. 1985).
The concept of ancillary jurisdiction is that the federal court, having jurisdiction of
the action between the original parties, may hear and determine claims between those
parties and other parties when the other claims are closely related to those already
before the court. The concept is the product of decisional law rather than statute ....
Id. Ancillary jurisdiction remains
often

a nebulous

concept in the relevant literature,

most

focusing on expanding jurisdiction to subject areas not explicitly contemplated in the

organic statute. See, e.g., James B. Speta, The Shaly Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8

J.

ON

TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110-11 (2010) (outlining the plausible extension of FCC
jurisdiction to regulate the Internet, which is not affirmatively discussed in the Federal
Communications Act). It remains unclear whether the concept of ancillary jurisdiction can
additionally

extend

to

agency

action beyond

regulation

(namely,

adjudication

and

enforcement), and if so, whether that action contemplates use of corporate law principles to
avoid creditor classification.
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If the facts of a situation indicate that passing penalties onto an
individual is critical to prevent that individual from circumventing a
statutory directive, then use of the corporate veil doctrine aligns with the
accepted cases above. However, if veil-piercing behavior serves a different
purpose, such as when used to maximize collection in bankruptcy
proceedings, then greater scrutiny should attach. In such a situation, the
agency shapeshifts away from its creditor status under the guise of protected
statutory grants. The bankruptcy process is delicately balanced to protect
creditors from inappropriate access to estate funds. When an agency has a
penalty claim against a corporation, they should not be permitted to
concurrently pierce the veil to affix liability to a solvent individual. To
better provide a check on the dual identity of administrative agencies in this
scenario, Congress should prohibit such behavior and courts reviewing
these veil-piercing transactions should not afford the same degree of
deference. 126
B. ShapeshiftingBetween Creditorand Regulator: the Second Thursday Problem
Although the Supreme Court in NextWave held that an agency cannot
cancel a debtor's license solely due to nonpayment, 27 PCS licenses may still
be transferred if a debtor corporation is liquidating or is no longer a
qualified licensee. The bankruptcy court is not authorized to transfer
licenses unilaterally to a new entity upon reorganization because only the
agency can qualify entities and subsequently award qualified entities
licenses.12 8 With that limitation in mind, imagine an administrative agency
with statutory control over the transfer of assets from a bankrupt estate,
selecting between two prospective bidders. The policy incentives justifying
such control-namely the agency's interest in determining who is the best
party to use certain regulated assets, such as spectrum licenses governed by
the FCC-are accepted and established by courts and legislators alike.1 29
Now imagine that the same administrative agency is additionally an
unsecured creditor in the bankruptcy case. The incentives that allow the
agency to stand in judgment of asset distribution are significantly weakened
when the agency's decision can impact collection of its own debts. Rather,
under these facts the competing bankruptcy interest of maximizing the
estate value and distributing the assets in an equitable fashion are at a
greater risk of self-interested regulatory action. "When the government

126. See infra Part IV.B (arguing the same).
127. See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
128. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2012).
129. See, e.g., Nat'1 Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1943) (confirming
the integral role of the FCC to manage public access to radio technology).
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. of regulator and creditor, courts have had to determine

'

which hat the government is wearing in connection with the conduct at
issue."130 It is difficult to accurately weigh the regulator-creditor distinction
when agency shapeshifting is based on an established doctrinal authority.
As a general matter of public policy, the FCC does not allow a licensee
that exhibits ongoing qualification problems to directly assign its licenses.' 3
Instead, the licenses are usually returned to the agency's control and
assigned after administrative hearings. Through the "Second Thursday
doctrine," 13 2 the Commission has identified a "limit[ed] exception .

.

. in

the case of licensees in bankruptcy or receivership" in which the FCC
approves the transfer of licenses without the standard process if it is
"convinced that the alleged wrongdoers will derive no benefit, either direct
or indirect, from the sale, or will derive only minor benefit which is
outweighed by the equities in favor of innocent creditors." 33 The FCC
makes Second hursday determinations through an "ad-hoc balancing" test,
weighing the erosion of regulatory authority caused by benefitting the
wrongdoer against the public interest benefit conferred onto innocent
creditors who are able to recover from the sale.1 34
The Second hursday doctrine involves a careful partnership between
bankruptcy courts that manage the debtor's estate and the FCC, which is
responsible for protecting its regulatory goals. It is intended to "protect
innocent creditors and to accommodate the policies of federal bankruptcy
law with those of the Communications Act." 3 5 Recognized benefits of the
Second Thursday doctrine include preventing "loss of service to the public"
and preserving administrative resources that would otherwise be spent
evaluating license applications. 3 6 Assumption of risk is also commonly
130. See In re Kan. Pers. Commc'n Servs., Ltd., 252 B.R. 179, 191 (Bankr. D. Kan.
2000); In re Kan. Pers. Comm'ns Servs., Ltd., 56 F. App'x 910 (10th Cir. 2003).
131. In re Eddie Floyd, 26 F.C.C. Rcd. 5993, 5994 (2011). This policy recognizes that
"permitting a licensee to evade the consequences of alleged or adjudicated misconduct by
transferring his interest or assigning his license will diminish the deterrent effect that
revocation or renewal proceedings should have on broadcast licensees." In re Family
Broadcasting, Inc. Order to Show Cause, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 7591, 7596 June 4, 2010).
132. In re Application of Second Thursday Corp., 22 F.C.C. 2d 515, 516 (1970),
reconsiderationgranted, 25 F.C.C. 2d 112 (1970).
133. In re Application of Mid-State Broad. Co., 61 F.C.C. 2d 196, 197 (1976).
134. LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
135. Third Amended Disclosure Statement, In re Mar. Commc'ns/Land Mobile, LLC,
No. 11BK13463, 2012 WL 5380513, at *32 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2012) (citing
LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1149). But see FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293,
294 (2003) ("The fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its action is
irrelevant.").
136. See Family Broad., 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 7591, 7599 (2010); see also Mar. Commcns, 2012
WL 5380513, at *33 ("There are also important public interest benefits that will flow from
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discussed in Second Thursday cases. The Commission weighs the interests of
the creditor, but ultimately recognizes that remedying the inherent risk in
broadcast investing (not to mention the general risk of becoming a creditor)
should not fall to the FCC.s?
Once the bankruptcy judge determines that the debtor's licenses should
be sold, the transfer is always "subject to FCC approval."1 38 The FCC
generally will not determine whether the Second hursday doctrine applies
before the bankruptcy court has approved the proposed transaction.1 39
Bankruptcy courts are careful to respect the regulatory jurisdiction of the
FCC,140 and the Agency's exclusive power to grant licenses provides an
opportunity for manipulation when the Agency is also a creditor. For
example, the Agency could strategically reject a bidder's proposed transfer
and informally "suggest" that the bidder's plan or asset sale be modified to
further compensate or provide guarantees to certain classes of creditors
(which include the Agency). While such explicit tactics at first blush seem
farfetched, they become more plausible upon consideration of the fact that
bankruptcy plan formation may often involve a high degree of negotiation
and gamesmanship.141 In the interest of promoting settlement or
agreement, some bankruptcy courts prefer to stay out of the fray and let the
42
agency's
An
parties negotiate desirable terms at arm's length.1
"negotiation tactics" to secure license approval is in many ways similar to
the plan formation process. Because plan proponents and bidders are
willing and able to adjust their offers to increase their chances, undue
influence by shapeshifting agencies through Second Thursday approvals is a
plausible concern.
In the Mantime Communications/LandMobile, LLC (MCLM) bankruptcy, the

the already-assumed and court approved sales to critical infrastructure entities.").
137. See Mid-State Broad., 61 F.C.C. 2d at 200 ("Any supplier of financial support, goods,
or services to a broadcast licensee assumes a certain amount of risk, as do all creditors in all
situations ... [but the FCC is] not required to eliminate it totally.").
138. Order, In re Mar. Commc'ns/Land Mobile, LLC, No. 11-13463-DWH, 2012 WL
6215456, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Dec. 7, 2012).
139. Third Amended Disclosure Statement Mar. Commcns, 2012 WL 5380513, at 32
(requiring a creditor not to "[have] knowledge of, nor [be] involved in, the alleged
wrongdoing").
140. Order, Mar. Commcns, 2012 WL 6215456, at *2 ("The Court is not attempting
through this Order, or otherwise, to superimpose its rulings or judgments upon the
FCC .... ").
141. For a general discussion of the role of gamesmanship in the context of bankruptcy
sales, including the permissive patterns of bankruptcy courts, see Matthew A. Bruckner,
Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Preliminar Injunction StandardFor Objections
to §363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 27-30 (2012).
142. Id.
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FCC was asked to apply the Second Thursday doctrine to approve license
transfers to one of two bidders.1 43 However, unlike other Second hursday
cases, in MCLM the FCC was also an unsecured creditor with a claim of
more than $6 million.1 44 Two bidders submitted offers: one bidder
proposed to pay unsecured creditors (including the FCC) the "full amount"
of their claims only after all other creditors "have received the full amounts
of their Claims . . . and assuming there is sufficient revenue";1 45 and the
other bidder guaranteed an immediate distribution of $1 million with
subsequent payment of the remaining full amount. Notwithstanding the
bankruptcy court's ultimate determination, the facts of the MCLM case
constitute a quintessentially problematic shapeshifting scenario.
Imagine a situation in which the FCC, dissatisfied with the existing plan
options, refuses to grant the license to either bidder. The bankruptcy court
already acknowledged that "if the FCC does not approve the Second
hursday plan as presented, [the debtor] will endeavor to modify the plan as
necessary to address the agency's concerns." 1 46 Confronted with the
possibility of a Second Thursday rejection, the debtor would have to scramble
to find another bidder to address agency "concerns." While the doctrine
likely contemplates the concerns of the ability of the new licensee to
adequately carry out the statutory purpose, one can imagine an agency
with unsecured creditor status raising additional, self-interested concerns
such as adequate assurance that creditors' claims will be satisfied or
automatic pay-outs to certain classes.
This hypothetical is also in tension with the Supreme Court's decision in
Next Wave. Arguably, if a debtor-licensee decides to transfer a license that is
subject to Second hursday approval, it has some connection to the
protections of § 525. Though the FCC is not directly revoking a license as
in Next Wave, refusing a sale effectuates the same agency interference with
the restructuring process. The agency is not authorized to make regulatory
decisions that are, or could be, based on their consequences to individual
creditors.
The Second 7hursday doctrine is enmeshed in the FCC's regulatory
doctrine, so it may appear at first glance that the shapeshifting concern is
limited to a single statutory arena. However, it is altogether plausible that
other agencies can create parallel doctrines, particularly when a particular
asset of a bankrupt estate is subject to regulatory approval. Without
143. Third Amended Disclosure Statement In re Mar. Commc'ns/Land Mobile, LLC,
2012 WL 5380513, at *19 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2012) ("Feasibility [of the Plan]
depends upon, among other things, a successful 'Second Thursday' approval by the [FCC].").
144. Id. at**17.
145. Id. at *26.
146. Id. at *34 (italics added).
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independent oversight, there is no check on an agency using its regulatory
authority to hold the bankruptcy process hostage until its unsecured claims
are adequately compensated. In some instances, the agency's desire to
maximize its recovery will correspond with the interests of the estate, other
creditors, and even the bankruptcy court. Yet, the fictional parallel breaks
down upon consideration of ways in which their interests diverge. The
shapeshifting agency in Second hursday situations will work to maximize
value to its specific claim, normally a general unsecured claim under § 507
of the Code. Bidders who act to please the agency may maximize recovery
to certain classes of creditors at the expense of others. The agency may
grant licenses to a bidder's plan that would not be the highest or otherwise
best in the eyes of the debtor. Finally, the delay and hassle caused by an
agency's manipulation may deter robust bidding, which would result in
fewer options for debtors and courts to restructure an insolvent
corporation.
A purely textual argument might provide one solution to the Second
hursday shapeshifting problem. Under the test, the FCC evaluates the
"equities . . . in favor of innocent creditors."

47

This "innocent creditor"

language at first blush relates to the underlying concerns with the distressed
licenses, namely that they will be sufficiently utilized to satisfy creditors.1 48

However, the same language could also be read to require the compensated
creditors to be disinterested in the proceeding. Here, the FCC is not an
"innocent" creditor, as it stands in judgment of the existing licensee and the
future bidders. Ironically, under this construction the FCC's dual creditorregulator status could be prohibited by the very same Second hursday text it
invokes to shapeshift. This interpretation has not been cited in the
literature, and it seems most likely that adoption of a strict impartial
creditor requirement would face resistance by the FCC. This
interpretation may face similar backlash from litigants and bankruptcy
courts, particularly in light of the pragmatic and precedential momentum
that supports swift license approval under Second Thursday.
III. USING THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK TO HIGHLIGHT
INADEQUACY IN EXISTING CHECKS AND BALANCES

In a vacuum, the two patterns of shapeshifting agency behavior
described above-piercing the corporate veil and the Second hursday
doctrine pose grave threats to the equitable distribution of assets in a
bankruptcy case. Fundamental notions of fairness dictate that, unless the
action satisfies a regulatory purpose, an agency should not be permitted to
147.
148.

In re Application of Second Thursday Corp., 22 F.C.C. 2d 515, 518 (1970).
Third Amended Disclosure Statement, Mar. Commcns, 2012 WL 5380513, at *32.
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maneuver its litigation status through procedural devices that are
unavailable to other similarly-situated creditors. Simply put, when a
regulatory body interacts with the bankruptcy process as creditor or other
interested party, the extra trappings and protections that accompany
agency status must fall away. The need to prevent agency shapeshifting
behavior is even more pressing when considered in the context of the
government's existing system of checks and balances. Traditional notions
of separation of powers provide a web of protection against too much
power accumulating in any branch of government, each operating to
prevent abuse within a delegated area of control. The political checks on
administrative agencies, typically categorized as acting through
the
executive branch,1 49 are often attributed to the voting public (by way of
replacing the executive officials that appoint agency heads), the legislature
(through increased or modified statutory grants of authority), and the
judiciary (providing judicial review of agency actions). Yet, shapeshifting
behavior is ongoing, even with existing preventative checks.
A. Agengy Relationships andAdministrative Law

This Section highlights the insufficiency of existing checks by applying a
principal-agent framework to instances of shapeshifting agency behavior.
A principal-agent connection is "the fiduciary relationship that arises when
one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent')
that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the
principal's control, and the agent manifests or otherwise consents so to
act." 50 Agents are authorized to make choices for the principal, yet their
actions must be reasonably related to the principal's intended grant of
authority.' 5 ' The principal-agent structure is useful for delegating tasks to
trusted actors, allowing the principal to efficiently accomplish goals that are
best done by others, either because of logistical constraints or the agent's
superior expertise. 5 2 Principals create procedures and guidelines for agent
behavior, defining a "discretionary window"-the agent's allowable realm

149. But see Niles, supra note 105, at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted)
("Independent administrative agencies (independent because they are intentionally
structured to function outside the direct control of the Executive Branch) have been created
to assist Congress, and even at times theJudiciary, in performing their required functions.").
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
151. Id.§2.01.
152. A universal assumption of the principal-agent model in public law is the ally
principle: "Voters, legislators, or other principals will rationally delegate more authority to
agents who share their preferences ('allies')." Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating
to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 2194-95 (2012).
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of authority. 5 3 Unfortunately, agents do not always act in desirable ways.
Agency law has long relied upon the principal actor to assume the cost of
ensuring appropriate agency behavior, yet "agency dilemma" 54 concerns
will often prevent an effective or efficient principal check. As a result,
agency law principles are most often utilized to determine which party is
responsible for the consequences of undesirable behavior. 5 5

However, case law delineating agency relationships and obligations is at
best inconsistent, casting doubt on the doctrine's utility in light of agency
dilemma issues. The common law application of agency law has in many
cases led to a functionalist result-the varying doctrines are "applied
haphazardly, giving rise to the suspicion that judges are deciding how the
cases should come out on commonsense grounds (however just these
intuitive decisions may be) and then groping for legal formalisms."15 6 The
"least-cost-avoider principle" offers a theoretical response to such
skepticism while also providing an approach to address the agency
dilemma. Borrowed from tort concepts-the so-called "Posnerian" features
of agency law the least-cost-avoider principle assigns the responsibility
and cost of agency-dilemma prevention to the party that can most
efficiently accomplish it.'s7 The least-cost-avoider principle most closely
aligns with ex ante prevention of harm and also with fundamental sentiments
of fairness, two concerns that are integral to reform shapeshifting behavior.
As such, when evaluating principal-agent relationships and the value of
potential checks, the desirable result for purposes of this Article requires
prevention efforts that minimize costs by assigning responsibility to the
party (or parties) that can most efficiently prevent future harm.
Though legal scholars have previously explored the principal-agent
model in the context of regulatory behavior, none has fully analyzed the
conflicting and overlapping relationships that are inherent in the current
administrative framework.15 8 Political scientists and economists have more

153. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Desgn, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1422, 1440 (2011) ("The principal, in other words, may use legal rules to establish the
agent's 'discretionary window.' When deciding how much discretion to delegate (that is, the
size and location of the discretionary window), the principal must weigh the potential
informational gains of delegation against the costs associated with potential agency bias.").
154. See infra Part III.A.1.
155. Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, 6 Am. L. & EcON. REV. 369, 370
(2004) ("When the agent takes a mistaken action, the damage must be allocated to
someone principal, agent, or third party.
156. Id. at 375.
157. Id. at 380 (arguing that, although the least-cost-avoider principle reduces incentive
for the other parties to take care, the principle has "efficiency properties," is easily applied,
and invokes "common ideas of fairness").
158. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et. al, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
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fully developed the reality of multiple-principal relationships, 5 9 yet much of
the existing literature fails to apply the results to the separation of powers
implications that are of concern to the legal academy. Scholarship most
commonly highlights the principle-agent relationship between the
regulatory agency and either the President or Congress, or both. 60 Legal
academics often focus on the "simple setting involving a single principal
and a single agent."' 6' What few recognize is that in certain circumstances,
the agency may also assume an agent role to the judiciary.1 62 Yet, courts
are frequently cited as a check on regulatory behavior through judicial
review of agency actions. 6 3 Overlooking the principal-agent relationship
between agencies and the courts places reliance on hollow protection.
Political Control, 3 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 243, 254-55 (1987) ("The analysis of this 'meta-game'
between principals is beyond the scope of this paper.").
159. See, e.g., GEORGE A. KRAUSE, A Two-WAY STREET 117 (1999) ("In all likelihood,
the principal-agent theory of political control over bureaucracy is an oversimplification of
social and political realities, which represent a particular class of administrative agencypolitical institution relationships from a broader spectrum."); Richard W. Waterman, Book

Review, 576 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 135, 136 (2001) (reviewing GEORGE A.
KRAUSE, A Two-WAY STREET (1999))

("Hence, there is an interactive component both

between principals and their agents and between various principals that has been largely
overlooked in past studies of bureaucratic politics.").
160.

See, e.g., Manik Roy, Pollution Prevention, Organizational Culture, and Social Learning, 22

ENVTL. L. 189, 206 (1992) (discussing "the agent-principal information problems between
the [state] Agency and its 'owners,' the governor and the legislature"); KRAUSE, supra note
159, at 7 ("Principal-agent based models of political control (or influence) state that the
preferences of elected officials (principals) are imposed on administrative organizations
(agents) through a variety of dependent relationships.").
161.

Stephenson, supra note

153, at 1438 (analyzing institutional design options to

maximize agency research initiatives).

162. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 572-73
(2000) (concluding that "governance in this more complicated light underlines the need for a
less agency-centered and more dynamic administrative law agenda," yet failing to highlight
the role of judiciary as principal); see also Waterman, supra note 159, at 136-37 (noting that
even Krause, who otherwise re-frames the analysis of principal-agent relationships in the
public law setting, does not address the role of the courts, a critical participant in the web of
agency behavior).
163.

Aaron R. Cooper, Note, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era of

Private Governance, 99 GEO. LJ. 1431, 1455 (2011) ("In reviewing an agency interpretation, a
court ensures that an agency stays within its statutory parameters-this is, at its most basic
level,

a check against the possibility that by delegating to an agency

Congress has

circumvented the constitutional system of separation of powers."); Freeman, supra note 162,
at 573 n.108 ("In administrative law scholarship, legislative and executive oversight and
judicial review are mechanisms for controlling the temptation of agents to deviate from their
mandates."). But see McCubbins et al., supra note 158, at 245 ("To the extent the courts
pursue policy objectives that do not conform to the wishes of elected officials, administrative
law (through legislation or executive order) may be in part a means for controlling the
judiciary as well as for assuring adherence to democratic values.").
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Because shapeshifting agencies are susceptible to agency dilemma problems
and serve as "agents" to multiple principals, the existing system of checks
(wherein abuse prevention may lie exclusively with another principal) will
fall short of a desirable degree of protection.
1. The Agency Dilemma
Agents always have incentives that diverge from the principal.
Economics can point to ways to make the incentives more aligned, and law
can supply incentives for agents not to pursue their own interests. But a
principal cannot write a contract that entirely avoids agency costs. In any
form of principal-agent relationship, problems occur when the incentives of
the agent diverge from those of the principal.1 64 This conflict is described
as the "agency dilemma" and is the subject of much scholarship.1 65
Information asymmetry contributes to ongoing agency dilemmas. Because
the agent might develop more expertise and have access to data unknown
to the principal, the agent may be in a position to take actions that benefit
itself without the principal's awareness. Assuming the principal knows about
the conflict, limited financial resources pose another challenge to
eliminating agency dilemmas. Often the cost of re-directing the agent to
act in accordance with the principal's directive is prohibitive, so the
principal instead tolerates the agent's ultra vires behavior.
Administrative agencies are particularly prone to the agency dilemma for
a number of reasons. Agencies lack "strict accountability to the
voters[,]

. . . are divided into units that are

also

sometimes terribly

miscoordinated and isolated from each other .... They are influenced by
both policy advocates and social networks, and are not able to enforce the
law absolutely."1 6 6 Furthermore, agencies are given a large scope of
judicial deference, creating a sense of autonomy that encourages

164. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 152, at 2196.
Almost any delegation entails a grant of authority by a principal to an agent whose
preferences are not identical to the principal's; some degree of preference divergence
is a ubiquitous if not inevitable feature of delegation. In reality, there will always be a
space of possible preferences and thus a continuum ranging from perfect alliance, in
which the preferences of principal and agent are perfectly aligned, to perfect enmity,
in which the preferences of principal and agent are at opposite extremes.
Id.
165. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First
Centur, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 448 (1996) (discussing the agency dilemma in corporate
governance issues); Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television: Implications
for Public Policy, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 65, 117 n.185 (1990) (discussing "the agency dilemma
[that] forms a vital consideration in [cable franchising] markets").
166. Roy, supra note 160, at 232.
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independent incentives and actions. Regulatory bodies operate with
guidance-from Congress, the Executive, or the courts-yet their actions
are more detached from the principal than in many agency relationships.
To utilize the expertise that justifies agency grants of authority, regulators
are frequently given the discretion to create rules, structure and manage
enforcement actions, and conduct parallel judicial proceedings. This
degree of self-government creates conditions ripe for self-serving incentives,
especially when agency budgets are comprised, in part, of collected fees and
penalties and enforcement that directly benefit their bottom line.16 7
Pinpointing instances of the agency dilemma can be difficult. As an
initial matter, evaluating the exact intent of any single regulatory action is
challenging. While it is possible that an agency may be acting in line with
the principal's goals, it may alternatively act to benefit its own interests in
the exact same action. In those instances-where an agent's action on the
surface appears to align with that of its principal-it becomes even more
challenging to recognize whether an agency dilemma impacted the final
action. Because such scenarios are harder to detect, especially by the
principal, they are even more costly to prevent. Additionally, agencies are
aware that their authority is directly limited by the bounds of the organic
act. To minimize the perception of self-interested actions, agencies make
efforts to characterize their behavior to fit within statutory lines-for
example, by justifying an action as serving the public purpose.
By shapeshifting from creditor to regulator, agencies exhibit the selfinterested behavior common to the agency dilemma. Penalty veil-piercing
of a bankrupt corporation is the clearest example of the agency dilemma.
The agency's incentive to pierce the veil of a bankrupt corporation to affix
liability onto an individual appears to be avoidance of creditor status.
Though Congress often drafts individual liability provisions into organic
acts, agencies may deliberately try to avoid such provisions by piercing the
veil. Similarly, to justify their veil-piercing behavior, agencies may cite
their intent to effectuate statutory goals through enforcement actions,
emphasizing the deterrent impact on other regulated entities. Yet, as
evidenced by the limited regulatory power exception to the automatic stay,
affixing a penalty and then becoming a creditor to a bankrupt corporation's
estate satisfies the same deterrent purpose. Agency veil-piercing for
purposes of collecting a penalty outside of the restructuring process moves
beyond action that is necessary to accomplish deterrence. Such actions are
beyond the principal's discretionary window and would only be done in an

167.

See, e.g., Glenn Bischoff, FCC Increases Enforcement Amid Budget Shortfall, URGENT

COMMC'NS (May 12, 2011), http://urgentcomm.com/policy-and_law/news/fcc-increases-

enforcement-20110512.
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agency's self-interest to obtain maximum collection.168
In the context of Second Thursday manipulation, the existence of an
agency dilemma is equally plausible, yet more challenging to separate from
the principal's regulatory dictate. The FCC is tasked with assigning and
transferring licenses, and in Second hursday evaluations the agency is doing
just that.1 69 When the FCC is a creditor to the bankrupt entity, its
regulatory purpose does not fade-it simply merges with the FCC's selfinterest in maximizing its return on an unsecured claim. The principal
(Congress) is unlikely to know that the FCC is doing anything but
transferring licenses. Members of Congress also lack the expertise to
evaluate whether the FCC's decision is based on (1) which party can best
provide spectrum service or (2) merely which plan better satisfies unsecured
creditors like the FCC. The agency dilemma in this example is not only
harder to prove, but it also exhibits the principal's inability, through
information asymmetry, to evaluate and prevent the
self-interested
behavior from continuing.
Both veil-piercing and Second hursday situations present instances where
an agency dilemma stands between the principal's interest and the agent's
underlying motivations to act. Redressing agency dilemmas is challenging
due to costs of prevention and information asymmetry, yet these challenges
only contemplate the existence of one principal. In many instances
multiple principals connect with a single agent, creating an additional layer
of complications that further threatens the ability of traditional checks to
prevent shapeshifting behavior.
2. The Problem of Multiple Pincipals
The existence of multiple principals only compounds the challenges
posed by an agency dilemma. When an agent is connected and owes
obligations to multiple parties, conflicts arise if the desired course of action
diverges. For example, an administrative agency may be the agent of many
principals: the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, to name a
few.' 70 To prevent certain behavior ex ante, the traditional motivations
168. It may be true that collecting debts is partially aligned with the principal's interest.
Yet, similar to the dividing line in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2012) between attachment and
enforcement, here the regulating function is far stronger in attachment. Additionally, as
discussed supra in Part I, the costs of enforcement far outweigh any marginal benefit.
169. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2012) (providing the FCC with authority to assign and
transfer licenses).
170. Public choice theorists would also point out that regulatory agencies are agents of
the American public. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Public Choice and Environmental
Policy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 450, 454-55 (Daniel
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (summarizing public choice scholars'
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suggested in agency law literature include increased sanctions and rewards,
more oversight, and additional procedures imposed by the principal.171
However, in a multiple-principal situation, these motivating actions can
only prevent such undesirable behavior if the motivating principal, or
principals, of an agent's action is known. If an agent is acting to serve one
principal, preventative efforts taken by a different principal ex ante are less
likely to be effective because they have divergent motivations and are
otherwise inadequate mechanisms. Furthermore, if an agent is acting on
behalf of two principals, one that wants to deter a certain behavior and the
other that wants to encourage it, traditional motivating actions may be
altogether inadequate. Thus, if the Legislature is the driving motivator in a
hypothetical scenario, then the Executive alone may not efficiently be able
to check the agent's behavior.
This challenge becomes still more complicated when evaluating and
attempting to counteract the impact of an agency dilemma. An agent's
own motivations may diverge from each of its principals, resulting in action
that any one principal alone cannot remedy or prevent. For example, an
agency's desire to shapeshift for maximized payment of penalties may
somewhat align with one principal (the Executive), but still be antagonistic
to its other principals (such as the Judiciary and Legislature). Agency
dilemma issues are in part driven by information disparities between
principal and agent; imagine the complications that arise when three
different principals operating with the same agent have three different pools
of information. The influence of multiple principals on one another is key
to understand and modify undesirable agent behavior. 72 Working to
prevent agency action that is inconsistent with the principals' directives
should be done collaboratively, with each principal taking some of the cost
to incentivize desirable behavior.1 73 If the principals cannot agree on what

consideration of broader interests in evaluating agency behavior, including those of the
general public). Without reaching the issue, this paper focuses on the three traditional
branches of government with the understanding that a dissatisfied public has the ability to
voice their concerns through the democratic process.
171. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 35 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds. 2004) (setting forth a number of
solutions to the principal-agent problem, including agent constraints, regulating the terms
between principals and agents, giving principals appointment and decision rights, and
offering incentives to agents).
172. Waterman, supra note 159, at 136 ("In addition, political principal behavior is
conditioned by the behavior of other principals. Hence, there is an interactive component
both between principals and their agents and between various principals that has been
largely overlooked in past studies of bureaucratic politics.").
173. It is possible that a single principal could develop a mechanism so powerful that it
counteracts the agent's desire to operate in its own interest or in the conflicting interest of
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action is desirable, a solution that results in predictable agency action-let
alone action that is preferable by any principal-becomes less plausible.
a. A Simple Illustration:Attorne Billing
For a better understanding of how discouraging self-interested agent
behavior is more difficult in multiple-principal situations, consider these
challenges in the familiar context of attorney billing.1 74 First, an attorney is
a fiduciary and agent of his client: the attorney (or firm) has signed an
5
agreement to represent the client in exchange for reasonable payment.17
The attorney is also an agent of the law firm. The attorney performs
services and represents clients on behalf of the firm and is obligated to
charge clients in a manner that compensates the firm's contribution.
Finally, an attorney is also an agent of the profession governed by the rules
of ethics and the obligations of faithful adherence to standards of practice.
An outcome that satisfies professional standards will in all likelihood align
with fundamental notions of fairness (a relevant concern in the least-costavoider model).17 6
In addition, the attorney has personal interests and incentives that will at
times conflict with the perspective of his different principals; he may want
to give better deals to his clients to encourage loyalty and develop
relationships; he might alternatively want to increase billing so he can look
better to the firm, make his hours, and get a yearly bonus. Thus, the
attorney's interests and motivations align with those of each of his
principals in some setting; yet, it will be difficult to determine ex ante which
principal will be served by each action or for each principal to evaluate an

other principals. Accepting that possibility, this Article proceeds under the assumption that
such a measure would be so challenging to create (due to information asymmetry,
enforcement, and oversight concerns) that the costs would be prohibitive and it is unlikely to
occur.
174. Perhaps due to its simplicity, this example is not novel to the agency literature. See,
e.g., Aaron Tang, The Ethics of Opposing CertiorariBefore the Supreme Court, 35 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 933, 940 (2012) ("The academic literature is replete with observations regarding selfinterested attorney action across a wide array of situations that arise in typical clientattorney relationships."); see also John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents:
An Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 1, 1 John W. Pratt & Richard

J.

Zeckhauser eds.,

1985).
175.

While payment structures have evolved to utilize alternative billing methods in

response to client demands (i.e., flat rate, contingency fee, etc.), the billable hour remains the
dominant form of payment. See Catherine Ho, Law Firms Look for Alternatives to the Billable
Hour,

WASH.

POST

(Apr.

15,

2012),

http://arcles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-

15/business/354513231 law-firms-alternadve-fee-arrangements-intellectual-property.
176.

See Rasmusen, supra note 155, at 380 (discussing the merits of the least-cost-avoider

principle).
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effective way to incentivize desired agent performance.
For example, assume that an attorney actually needs x hours to complete
a client's motion for summary judgment. In that case, x also represents the
number of hours that would be supported as ethical by the legal profession
to bill the client. Perhaps the client mentions that he would appreciate the
attorney billing for x - 10 hours, while the firm would prefer the attorney to
take x + 10 hours to complete the work. The attorney is asked to serve the
profession and bill ethically, to maintain and develop the client's loyalty by
giving him a "deal," and to please the firm by contributing to the bottom
line. The attorney could also be driven by different personal incentives,
independent of the principals: perhaps a sense of personal integrity to "do
the right thing," a desire to protect a valuable client relationship so a
different attorney does not get future business, or the need to maximize
billing to be successful at the firm. Attorneys faced with this situation must
ultimately make a choice (some form of bill is inevitably sent to the client),
yet absent a form of "exit-polling" it is almost impossible to determine what
ultimately motivated the attorney to act, or not act, in line with each
principal's desired outcome. As such, it is equally challenging to incentivize
the attorney's future behavior without additional information.
Now, suppose instead that the principals have jointly decided that,
within a certain range, billing should most closely align with actual costs.
The firm might make less money, but it will avoid negative press and the
potential loss of future clients. The client might pay more, but it will not be
utilizing an underpaid, and perhaps less enthusiastic, agent. Assuming that
over- or under-billing is an undesirable outcome, and that the only parties
that can impact the attorney's behavior are the principals, relying on any
single party to correct the agent's behavior is unlikely to succeed. If the
client alone says that he does not want to be under-billed, nothing is in
place to prevent the attorney from over-billing in line with the firm's
ongoing incentives. Similarly, if the firm sets a policy that billing in excess
of the work completed will not be condoned, the attorney may still underbill in his interest to foster the client relationship. An effective system of
checks will require the collaboration of multiple principals to change the
agent's behavior. Working together, the principals can structure incentives
that minimize positive reinforcement for undesired deviations and
encourage the attorney to conform, despite the potential for ongoing
independent motivations.
The ongoing prominence of attorney billing as the core of "lawyer
jokes" 77 and the focus of mainstream media' 78 indicate that this dilemma is

177. See, e.g., Lawyer
24, 2016).

Jokes,

http://unijokes.com/joke-905/ joke 905) (last visited May.
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not merely hypothetical. Yet, the example also provides a simple
illustration of the overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, principal-agent
issues that may frustrate prevention of shapeshifting agency behavior.
b. Multiple Pincipalsin Shapeshifting Behavior
Regulatory agency behavior is often connected to multiple principals.
As discussed above, administrative agencies are most obviously evaluated as
agents of the Executive Branch. At a basic level, the President is unable to
perform the countless tasks that must be completed to administer a
functional government. Not only does the Executive not have the time to
properly oversee each government role, it often lacks the expertise to make
the decisions necessary to guide state actions. As a result, regulatory
agencies were created to oversee and manage the day-to-day needs of
government programs. Agency leaders are usually appointed by the
Executive, tend to respond to Executive influences, and answer to the
Executive when mistakes occur. The relationship between the Executive
and agencies is a classic embodiment of a principal-agent connection.
Agencies are also agents of the Legislature. Though agencies are
responsible for the regulations that constitute the majority of standards
governing regulated parties, the organic statutes that create and empower
agencies come directly from Congress. In the case of independent agencies,
the Legislature assumes a primary principal role in absence of executive
oversight. By shaping the organic acts, Congress dictates objectives and a
preferred course of action to its agents. Often, Congress does not have the
necessary information or expertise to provide detailed guidelines; general
grants of authority and expressed purpose are designed to allow the agency
breathing room to best accomplish the legislature's goals. It also leaves
room for agency manipulation, 79 and in many cases may limit the check of
A lawyer died and arrived at the pearly gates. To his dismay, there were thousands of
people ahead of him in line to see St. Peter. But, to his surprise, St. Peter left his desk
at the gate and came down the long line to where the lawyer was standing. St. Peter
greeted him warmly. Then St. Peter and one of his assistants took the lawyer by the
hands and guided him up to the front of the line into a comfortable chair by his desk.
The lawyer said, "I don't mind all this attention, but what makes me so special?" St.
Peter replied, "Well, I've added up all the hours for which you billed your clients, and
by my calculation you must be about 193 years old!
Id.
178. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Suit Offers a Peek at the Practice of Inflating a Legal Bill, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/suit-offers-apeek-at-the-practice-of-padding-a-legal-bill/ (detailing a suit between law firm DLA Piper
and a client, and discussing the problem of overbilling generally).
179. See McCubbins et al., supra note 158, at 257 ("If greater delegation allows agencies
greater opportunties to pursue their own goals, it only helps the agencies, not the political
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the Judiciary.
Most analysis of the principal-agent structure to date has completely
ignored the possibility that agencies may be acting for the Judiciary. For
this reason, it is not surprising that the Judiciary is frequently cited as a
check on the agency dilemma. However, the shapeshifting behavior
evaluated in this Article brings attention to the need for a new discussion of
multiple-principal relationships in administrative law due to the judiciary's
potential principal role. By piercing the corporate veil to circumvent
creditor status, administrative agencies are operating as agents of the
Judiciary. Though the corporate veil is a fiction of business law, its
protection, and thus its viability, rests with the Judiciary. Courts tread
gently behind the veil only in dire circumstances, and in all other instances
work to protect the corporate form. Restructuring courts also are obligated
to maximize the value of the bankrupt estate for equitable distribution to
creditors. 80 By piercing the corporate veil in a parallel administrative
judicial proceeding, agencies are acting as agents of the Judiciary when they
seek to collect penalties against individuals instead of obtaining their
portion of the corporation's estate as an unsecured creditor.' 8' A
bankruptcy court has the power to pierce the corporate veil and attach
liability to individuals behind debtor corporations when it sees fit, after
weighing the circumstances at issue in any particular case. While many
agencies have the power to affix individual liability through independent
provisions in the organic statute-an action that would be strictly
regulatory and fall outside the principal-agent relationship-veil-piercing
and connecting liability of the corporation to an individual in the shadow of
bankruptcy circumvents the bankruptcy court's interest in protecting and
disbursing the debtor's estate and preserving the corporate form.18 2
A regulatory agency is also operating as an agent of the Judiciary in the

principals. Hence, the greater delegation implies a greater need for effective control
mechanisms.").
180. See DennisJ. Connolly, Current Issues in Auction Sales, in 2005 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L.
41, 48 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 2005) ("The goal and duty of the bankruptcy court is to
ensure, as best possible, that the highest and best value for the property has been
obtained.").
181. Much of the judicial function of administrative agencies is created by Congress and
found in the APA. While legislation by a third party may be an unlikely foundation for a
principal-agent relationship between the judiciary and administrative agencies, the courts'
accession to and adoption of agency proceedings through its deferential approach suggest
that such a relationship exists.
182. Harry D. Lewis, Enjoining Regulator Action Against Chapter 11 Debtors, 96 CoM. LJ.
335, 350 (1991) ("The regulatory agency and the reorganization court can function
concurrently in most situations. It is only when the proposed agency action threatens
property of the estate or the reorganization process that court intervention is necessary.").
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Second Thursday license transfer situation. Though approving, transferring,
and controlling spectrum licenses is an exclusively regulatory task, the
situation transforms when the FCC is also an unsecured creditor evaluating
two competing license applications. The bankruptcy court traditionally
holds the role of approving the best restructuring plan; when plan approval
is contingent upon FCC license grants, in effect the FCC is acting as the
court's agent because it has the exclusive authority to determine which of
two plans will succeed. By selectively awarding licenses that maximize
creditor returns, the FCC is in essence operating as the judge of its own
case.183 If the Judiciary, as principal actor, allows the FCC to act as its
agent (through ajudicialy-createddoctrine), it is less likely that the courts will
also serve as an independent check on self-interested shapeshifting
behavior. Though the Judiciary should stand guard between the
administrative actor and the estate,1 84 alignment of interests may lessen the
vehemence of protection afforded by the court. The bankruptcy judge has
an interest in encouraging swift confirmation of plans to maximize the
estate value and encourage finality. 85 If the agency's incentive to get top
dollar on its unsecured claim (by encouraging competing bidders to
maximize recovery for certain classes of creditors) does not conflict with,
and potentially encourages, swift confirmation, the judicial principal may
approve of the agent's behavior. At a minimum, it seems likely that the
bankruptcy court will hesitate to incur the cost to shift the agent's
incentives. Even if the agency's behavior is undesirable to the other
principals, third party regulated actors, or the general public under notions
of fairness, the Judiciary may not provide an adequate check.
Because shapeshifting behavior involves inherent agency dilemma
problems particularly when the agency's behavior is motivated by
maximizing financial recovery as an unsecured creditor-and multiple-

183. This violates the longstanding norm of "nemo iudex in su causa"-that no man should
be judge in his own case. But see generally Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo ludex in Sua
Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE LJ. 384 (2012) (discussing instances in which
violating the nemo iudex principle might not be universally prohibited).
184. Lewis, supra note 182, at 349-50.
If the agency is attempting to create, perfect or enforce a lien, or to control property
of the estate, or holds a monetary claim against the debtor much like any other party
in interest in the bankruptcy proceeding, then restraint of the agency by the
reorganization court, including injunction if necessary, is warranted. Striking such
balances should be an inherent part of the work of the reorganization court.
Id.
185. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 245-49 (1992)
(explaining that, due to rapid fluctuation in value, delays in the restructuring process are
contrary to the interests of both debtors and creditors who seek to maximize the value of the
estate).
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principal complications, the existing separation of powers checks are
inadequate to deter ongoing harm. In many ways the agency incentives do
not deviate significantly from expressed incentives of the principal. Seeking
to collect penalties does deter other violators, thus it can be classified as
serving the regulatory purpose set forth by Congress; the problems posed
by the particular method of collection (veil-piercing) may not justify the
expense necessary for the Legislature as principal to prevent future harm.
In veil-piercing situations, the Judiciary acting as principal might find the
agent's behavior to be more troubling because it undermines two carefullyprotected court roles-observing the corporate form and equitably
dispersing the insolvent estate; however, without assistance from the
Legislative Branch, any remedial effort to counteract the agency's desire to
collect money may be too costly to justify. For example, the NextWave
Court noted in the context of license cancellation that, if the agency "were
allowed to enforce its rights outside the bankruptcy process, that would
create an 'anomaly' compared to the rights of ordinary secured
creditors." 86 However, in NextWave the agency's action was prohibited by
§ 525 of the Code, a provision Congress designed to protect against
regulatory discrimination.18 7 It was the combination of legislative and
judiciary protections that prevented undesirable agency behavior; either
aspect alone might not have redressed the FCC's action.
B. Silent Regulated Parties
Another strand of agency theory might suggest that private entities can
protect themselves within the agency process. Recent scholarship focuses
on a "new" model of governance in the modern administrative state,
highlighting the role of private actors and the regulated industry in an
increasingly collaborative agency process. 8 8 If private actors do indeed
186. Thacker v. FCC, 533 U.S. 1004 (2008) (No. 07-803), 2008 WL 899315, at *5
(Reply Brief) (citing FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns. Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 307-08 (2003)).
187. See NextWave Pers. Commc'ns., 537 U.S. at 313-14 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
188. See, e.g., Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to
Legitimacy: The Example of the InternalModels Approach to CapitalAdequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L.
REV. 783, 854 (2010) ("The involvement of third-party stakeholders such as public interest
groups to supervise and contribute to regulatory compliance enhances the legitimacy and
effectiveness of a broad participatory regime and minimizes the risks of capture."); Freeman,
supra note 162, at 571.
In contrast to those presenting hierarchical models of administrative law, I conceive
of governance as a set of negotiated relationships. This alternative conception of
policy making, implementation, and enforcement is dynamic, nonhierarchical, and
decentralized, envisioning give and take among public and private actors.
Information, expertise, and influence flow downward, from agency to private actors;
upward, from private actor to agency; and horizontally, among public and private
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play a significant role in the regulatory process, then it could be argued that
their influence as a different form of principal (or a substitute third party)
could offer an additional check on undesirable agency behavior. Advocates
of the "new governance" model suggest that "increased participation and
power-sharing allow for structuring collaborative solutions to complex
problems." 89 Yet, the ability of these entities-whether they are speciallyformed industry organizations, or merely regulated individuals or
corporations-is low to provide a meaningful check on shapeshifting.
As an initial matter, the contribution of so-called collaborative private
actors is often ex ante and directed at creating better-informed practices.
Scholars highlight the possibility that private actors will assist primarily in
rulemaking and procedure. Though Congress has acknowledged a
potential role for third parties to encourage enforcement, that model of
participation is inadequate to redress shapeshifting for three reasons. First,
reliance on private actors presupposes a layer of transparency in
administrative actions that is far from evident.1 90 If third parties are
unaware that shapeshifting behavior is occurring, they cannot effectively
challenge it. Second, private action is directed at encouraging the
compliance of other regulated parties, not at reviewing the method or
manner of agency enforcement.191 Focusing on third parties would only
stop shapeshifting to the extent that it coincided with instances of regulatory
evasion, an unlikely result from the examples discussed in this Article.
Finally, even when the statute explicitly waives sovereign immunity and
provides a cause of action against agency inaction, the scope of third party
challenges has been narrowly confined to non-discretionary behavior, such
as forming a review board by a certain date. Manipulating statutory roles
and corporate doctrines to gain preferential treatment is not the same as

actors.

Id.
189. Weber, supra note 188, at 842.
190. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
617, 619-20 (2010).
Government institutions operate at a distance from those they serve. To be held
accountable and to perform well, the institutions must be visible to the public. But in
the normal course of their bureaucratic operation, public organizations-sometimes
inadvertently, sometimes willfully; sometimes with good intent, sometimes with
unethical or illegal intent-create institutional impediments that obstruct external
observation. These obstructions must be removed in order for the institutions to be
visible and, ultimately, transparent.
Id.
191. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 98-100, 108-09 (2005)
(discussing a variety of private agency enforcement actions and intended benefits).
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the non-discretionary agency inaction that led Congress to provide private
causes of action. Some might argue that veil-piercing and selective
licensing via the Second hursday doctrine are just the opposite: an agency
affirmatively acting to further its statutory mandates. Furthermore, nonstate actors must still have constitutional standing to bring such claims. For
most private actors, the injury-in-fact requirement' 92 will not be satisfied to
challenge shapeshifting agency behavior.
Agency law provides for third party claims by the harmed party, directed
at either the agent or the principal, to remedy wrongs. In certain instances,
third parties are relied upon to prevent undesirable agent behavior; their
legal challenges are the most efficient method to prevent ongoing violations,
as the principal's efforts may be too costly or ineffective. Similarly, the
APA provides for appellate review of agency actions,1 93 allowing regulated

parties to draw attention to agency missteps so the challenger can be
compensated and the behavior will be deterred in the future. Allowing
injured parties-such as the bidder who did not receive Second Thursday
approval or the individual subject to veil-piercing to bring suit provides
the judiciary with another opportunity to check shapeshifting agency
behavior.1 94 Yet, these actions are unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review mandates deference
to agency discretion in all but the most egregious breaches of statutory
guidelines.1 95 Second, in many cases the injured parties in shapeshifting
scenarios will not be interested in challenging the agency. Corporations
that plan to continue operating in a certain industry might hesitate to bring
suit against an agency when subsequent approvals, licenses, and other
mandatory clearances lie with that same regulatory body. Some actors
might find that the risk of agency backlash is worth taking, yet the
deterrence of even a small percentage of injured parties calls into question
the efficacy of third parties as a check.
The principal-agent model highlights more problems than solutions in
the context of administrative agencies. Chapter 11 shapeshifting agencies
act to maximize collection of their debts in ways that principals may not
have the information or power to stop, a situation that is further

192. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (oudining the
requirements for standing).
193. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-09 (2012).
194. If the judiciary is operating as one of multiple principals in the specific situation,
then the same questions discussed supra in Part III.A.2. apply.
195. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). Over time, the courts' recognition of shapeshifting
agency behavior may shape the contours of the arbitrary and capricious standard. Such a
shift, however, cannot be the sole approach to prevent circumvention of the Bankruptcy
Code's priority rules by shapeshifting agencies.
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complicated by the presence of multiple principals. When a body that is
expected to check undesirable behavior is also a principal to the agent,
oversight that may appear sufficient may in fact be illusory. Finally, the
role of third parties in the administrative agency setting does not offer
sufficient additional scrutiny. Unlike the possibility that third parties may
be the least-cost-avoider in agency law, administrative agencies maintain a
degree of leverage over the third parties with standing to seek judicial
review that prevents robust challenges. Other regulated or interested
parties may call attention to shapeshifting behavior, but they lack the
mechanism and judicial forum to hold an agency legally accountable for its
actions. Existing oversight structures are tangled in the web of principalagent connections. Thus additional measures must be taken to prevent
continuing shapeshifting behavior.
IV. SOLUTIONS

A. Statutory Bar
One potential solution to prohibit shapeshifting behavior involves an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code. The Code already has various
provisions that reflect certain shifts in incentives that may similarly support
shapeshifting prevention: namely, the desire to stop parties from acting with
their own self-interest in the face of an impending bankruptcy; and the
desire to protect the absolute priority scheme against preferential treatment
of certain creditors.
These congressional priorities were codified in
§§ 327(a) and 503(b)(9) and indicate that Congress may be amenable to
adding a similar agency-specific provision.1 96 The provisions also provide
valuable examples upon which such a regulatory provision could be based.
The Code provides an established priority scheme,1 97 allowing deviations
only in pressing circumstances and with increased judicial oversight.
Bankruptcy Code § 503(b)(9) allows a priority payment of certain goods
delivered within twenty days of the bankruptcy filing.1 98 Commentators
have criticized this provision as a "dramatic departure from bankruptcy
precedent" because it requires a debtor to pay these claims in full,
notwithstanding that such claims previously were classified as general
unsecured claims.1 99 Section 503(b)(9) offers a valuable example of certain

196.

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a), 503(b)(9) (2012).

197.

See id. § 1129(b)(2).

198. Id. § 503(b)(9).
199. Brendan M. Gage, Should Congress Repeal Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b) (9), 19 Am.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 215, 216-17, 217 n.7 (2011) (suggesting drastic reforms to § 503(b)(9)
and listing articles that discuss its problematic prioritization effects).
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protections that should attach to a measure that circumvents traditional
priority structures-a parallel situation to many instances of agency
shapeshifting. 200 For instance, the provision requires "notice and a
hearing" prior to allowing the select class of administrative expenses, which
constitute only a small impact on the estate's value. 20' This suggests that
Congress would support similar, if not greater, efforts to draw attention to
shapeshifting agencies that seek to manipulate their creditor status through
regulatory authority. 202
The Code also incorporates measures to protect the estate against selfinterested representation. For example, § 327(a) of the code prohibits
attorneys with conflicting interests to represent the debtor's estate. 203 The
conflict prohibition requires attorneys to be "disinterested," which the
Bankruptcy Code explicitly defines as, inter alia, "a person that . . . is not a
creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider." 204 The bankruptcy
standard governing conflicts is more narrowly drawn and more strictly
applied than general conflict rules dictated by profession-wide ethical
standards. 205 For example, conflicts in legal representation can be waived
under the model rules of ethics, yet bankruptcy courts may not allow
waivers under certain circumstances. 206 Congress's adherence to elevated
conflict prevention standards in bankruptcy has been attributed to the
"unique pressures inherent in the bankruptcy process." 207 Such pressures
§ 503(b)(9).
201. § 503(b).
200.

202. The Bankruptcy Code is full of similar examples that require notice-and-comment
procedures, all of which indicate an express congressional intent to highlight situations that
might foster inequities and provide creditors with adequate information to make informed
decisions. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), 364(b), 366(b), 505(b)(2)(B) (2012).
203. See id. § 327(a). The Bankruptcy Code states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the court's approval,
may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other
professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate,
and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the
trustee's duties under this tide.
Id.
204. Id. §§ 101(14(A), 327(a).
205. See Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining the strict conflict
rules in bankruptcy cases); In re Diamond Mortg. Corp. of Ill., 135 B.R. 78, 90 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1990) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code prohibits waiver of the conflict caused by
simultaneous representation of a client and his or her creditor, but that such a waiver is
permitted outside the bankruptcy context).
206. See Matthew L. Warren, The Continuing Lack of Guidance on Professional Retention in
Bankruptcy and its PotentialImpact on CorporateDebtors' Retention ofAdequate Legal Counsel, 53 ARIZ.
L. REV. 533, 552 (2011) ("Courts have typically explained that conflict waivers simply do not
trump the requirements of § 327(a).").
207.

NAT'LBANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY 874 (1997).
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include a desire to maintain the public's "confidence in the integrity of the
bankruptcy system," a motivation that has led to previous Code reforms. 208
Although § 327(a) relates to professional retention, similar concerns may
arise when agencies hold the power to grant licenses. In addition, existing
law exhibits Congress's understanding that federal employees may not act
in certain situations when they possess a stake in the outcome. 209 Thus,
similar prohibitions against self-interested agency action in the bankruptcy
context should be well received.
Another instance of the Code's concern with conflicted loyalties is
§ 1129(a)(10), which governs cramdown procedures in the context of a
debtor's plan. 210 Under that section, when a class of claims is impaired
under a plan of restructuring, meaning they will not receive full repayment
of their debt, the plan can only be crammed down if "at least one class of
claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined
without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider." 21' In that
context, the Code prohibits the counting of votes for insiders, showing its
intent to identify and isolate those parties that may be driven by tertiary
considerations. Indeed, the Code's definition of "insider" is rather
broad, 212 and although an agency with rulemaking powers would not
cleanly fit within that definition, the Code's treatment of insiders is
illustrative of a broader perspective on divided loyalties that should extend
to shapeshifting agencies.
I suggest that the Code should be amended to prohibit agency creditors
from taking regulatory actions that solely benefit the agency's financial
stake in connection with an ongoing bankruptcy. In most cases, this
provision will not prevent an agency from conducting necessary operations.
For example, an agency with unsecured creditor status would be prohibited

208.

See G. Ray Warner, Of Grinches, Alchemy and Disinterestedness: The Commission's Magically

DisappearingConflicts ofInterest, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 423, 429-30 (1997).
209. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2012) (forbidding executive officials from participating
in actions in which they or persons or entities closely associated with them have "a financial
interest"); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciar Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117,
156, 156 n.156 (2006) (discussingthe same).
210. See Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward Removing Artificial Limits on
Chapter II Claim Classification, 11 BANKR. DEVELOPMENTSJ. 1, 2 (1995)
Cramdown, a bankruptcy term of art, refers to confirmation which occurs even
though the plan proponent has not obtained the assent of all creditor classes. To
achieve cramdown, the proponent must meet all other confirmation requirements and
the plan must be 'fair and equitable' and not unfairly discriminatory as to the
dissenting class.
Id.
211. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
212. Id. § 101(31).
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from piercing the debtor corporation's veil to affix regulatory penalties to
an individual.2 13 The penalty can still be attached to the corporation,
which would then be subject to standard priority distribution procedures.
Such an action would allow the deterrence impact of a penalty to be
realized without using veil-piercing to circumvent unsecured creditor status.
Furthermore, an agency could still prevent a single regulated actor from
committing offenses by initiating enforcement proceedings against an
individual, to the extent that such penalties are condoned by the agency's
organic act.
However, in some instances agency action is necessary for
the
bankruptcy to progress. Unlike the strict application of attorney-conflict
rules, in which different representation must be obtained, in the regulatory
setting a single agency often has the sole authority to take certain actions,
and disqualification is impossible. In those rare instances, under my
proposed addition to the Code, the bankruptcy court should have the
discretion to approve conflicted agency action. For example, in many Second
Thursday approval situations, the agency will be a creditor sitting in
judgment of two plans that require license approval. If both plans afford
the same priority and compensation to the agency's claim, then the
proposed provision would not apply; however, if there were consequential
differences, the agency would not be permitted to grant license transfer
because it could benefit its creditor status. In such a case, the bankruptcy
court should have a measure of discretion to allow the estate to move
forward (and so that the general public does not suffer the disruption
caused by regulatory delay). In cases that require a bankruptcy court to use
its discretionary approval, the provision should also incorporate a notice
requirement. The bankruptcy court should conduct an open hearing about
the potential conflict prior to approval, and any record of the agency's
parallel action should include an explicit explanation in a disclosure
statement that the agency is a creditor in the bankruptcy. Such notice is
helpful to prevent the bankruptcy court, as a potential principal of the
agency, from issuing discretionary approval without some form of
oversight-even if only by the opposing litigants and exposure to public
scrutiny. It also serves notice on the other parties to the bankruptcy case,
who will be in a better position to raise challenges to shapeshifting behavior
before the bankruptcy court.
Previous examples indicate that even the best-laid statutory plans often
do not result in the desired outcome. Almost inevitably, some
uncontemplated aspect of a new provision gives rise to confusion and

213. See, e.g., In re Telseven, LLC, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 15,558, 15,571-72 (2012) (explaining
this to be true "even when strict standards of common law alter ego would not apply").
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Such was the case with both
varying interpretations in the courts.
§ 327(a) 214 and § 503(b)(9).215 For this reason, and because the solution to
Chapter 11 shapeshifting behavior will be most effective with efforts from
multiple principals, the Judiciary should also implement a deference
adjustment.
B. Deference Adjustment
Codifying rules that are designed to prevent Chapter 11 shapeshifting
may significantly deter such behavior; however, previous cases demonstrate
that Code modifications can often lead to unsettled application in the
courts.
This potential is heightened in the instance of shapeshifting
agencies because, in certain situations, the courts are acting as principals to
the agency's action. 216 As such, an additional check should be affixed to
agency shapeshifting. I propose a deference adjustment in instances where
the agency's regulatory action occurs in the same case where it is a creditor.
Under § 702 of the APA, agency actions are subject to judicial review. 217
Such review entails overturning agency actions that are "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 2 1 8 This standard offers a high degree of deference to agency actions,

though doctrinal development has also shaped the deference landscape. 219
The concept that courts afford different degrees of deference as necessitated
by different factual situations is well-established. 220 It has also long been
214.

See Warren, supra note 206, at 542 (discussing disagreement in the courts regarding

"how strictly the per se rules of [disinterested representation] should be applied").
215. See Gage, supra note 199, at 219 (explaining that "courts apply their own definitions
and form conclusions, often based on whichever policy consideration they assume Congress
intended or deem most persuasive," leading to "a remarkable divergence over nearly every

legal issue involving § 503(b)(9), highlighting the growing potential for forum shopping").
216.

See supra Part III.

217.
218.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
Id. § 706(2)(A).

219. See James M. Puckett, Embracing the Queen of Hearts: Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules, 40
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 349, 360 (2013) (discussing the arbitrary and capricious standard as a
"narrow" check, only "requir[ing] that an agency consider relevant factors and arrive at a
conclusion in a reasonable manner"). In many instances there is good reason for the
deferential standard because it allows agencies to minimize intervention and maximize the
impact that their expertise can have on the regulatory

subjects. However, this grant

presupposes that agencies will behave with certain decorum. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three
Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1101-02 (2008) (discussing the forms of
agency behavior that support an "epistemically based rule of deference").
220.

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:

Supreme Court Treatment ofAgency Statutoy Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. LJ.
1083

(2008)

(categorizing

the

Court's

spectrum

of deference

to

different

agency

interpretations); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. LJ.
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observed that an agency may act for its own self-benefit, and such actions
should receive less deference: 221"It would exceed the bounds of fair play to
allow an institutionally self-interested advocacy position, which may
properly carry a bias, to control the judicial outcome."2 22 Courts have
recognized this reality, and have hesitated to extend deference to such
actions.223 In the context of preemption determinations, for example, the
"prospect of agency bias" in a decision "weighs against the application of
Chevron deference." 224 Other scholars have noted that deference should be
limited when the agency offers its position as a litigant. 225 An agency's
motivation for financial benefit-as suggested here in the veil-piercing and
Second Thursday shapeshifting contexts-has also led to calls for a reduction
in the deference afforded to these kinds of agency shapeshifting decisions. 226
833 (200 1) (comparing the strength of deference under Skidmore and Chevron doctrines); Eric
M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 986, 1005 (1987) (finding deference less appropriate "where an agency
interpretation shapes a statute's core meaning or an agency has a substantial interest in its
interpretation" (emphasis added)).
221. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Ageng Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 206 (2004) ("Principles rooted in notions of due process weigh against
according Chevron deference to interpretations implicating the self-interest of the issuing
agency."); Criddle, supra note 209, at 156 ("Due process prohibits courts from granting
deference to an administrative agency's judgment if there is a possibility that idiosyncratic
institutional interests could compromise the agency's impartiality."); Cass R. Sunstein, Law

and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2076 (1990) ("Perhaps ...

an

agency view will not warrant deference when its self-interest is conspicuously at stake.").
222. Robert A. Anthony,
YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 60 (1990).
223.

hich Agency

Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7

See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamango, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (remanding for de

novo review due to U.S. Attorney's overwhelming motivation to certify for purposes of the

Federal Tort Claims Act); Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1571
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987) ("Deference might lead a court to endorse
self-serving views that an agency might offer in a post hoc reinterpretation of its contract.").

224.

Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 794 (2004); see

also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441,
1478 (2008) ("Consistent with the federalism-protective constitutional structure, there is
concern among scholars that federal agencies harbor a turf-grabbing or turf-protecting bias
that would over-preempt state law if the Court followed their lead routinely, and there is a
constituency within the Court for this concern.").

225.

See Bresgal v. Brock, 833 F.2d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1987) (arguing that the Secretary

of State should not be entitled to more deference that any party involved in the suit); Sharon
Hritz, Beck v. Pace International Union: A Mask of Unanimity to Conceal Disagreement and

Confusion, 28

J.

NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN.

L. JUDICIARY 673, 691 (2008) ("The debate on

deference to an agency's interpretation presented in litigation has been joined by several
circuit courts, with the general consensus that no deference is due [to] such interpretations
presented in litigation.").
226. Braun, supra note 220, at 1006 ("Agency aggrandizement is also at issue where an
agency has a substantial and obvious institutional interest in its interpretation. In some
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Due to the strong potential for self-aggrandizement where an agency is
an unsecured creditor in a corporation's bankruptcy, I suggest that
shapeshifting behavior should be uniformly found not to pass the so-called
"Chevron Step Zero" analysis. 2 2 7 Instead, Chapter 11 shapeshifters should

be afforded only Skidmore deference.2 28 Further, such agency action should
be subject to de novo review on appeal. 229 This proposal does not break
new ground; rather, numerous scholars have suggested similar adjustments
in cases of agency self-interest. 230 Some suggest that the Supreme Court
itself has taken this position. 23' However, the case for adjusted deference is
particularly strong in shapeshifting scenarios due to the multiple-principal
relationships at play. As attention has not yet been cast upon agency
shapeshifting behavior in bankruptcy, this Article aims to bring focus to yet
another instance where deference adjustment is merited, if not critically
necessary.

situations the agency interest is monetary."); Kristin E. Hickman, The Needfor Mead: Rejecting

Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1597 (2006) ("Many
agencies . . . have been known to test the boundaries of the statutes they administer. for
reasons as base as financial self-interest.").
227. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (discussing the
Chevron step zero analysis). This analysis eliminates deference from agency decisions that do
not have the "force of law." See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001);
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
228. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (giving weight to an agency view
based on "all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control").
229. The de novo standard breaks down the preference given to agencies and provides
the same review that would be given "in a statutory or regulatory interpretation case not
involving agency action." Armstrong, supra note 221, at 207.
230. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 227, at 209-10. As Sunstein noted:
But when an agency's self-interest is so conspicuously at stake, Congress should not be
taken to have implicitly delegated law-interpreting power to the agency .... It is not
all that complicated to offer an amended understanding of Chevron's reach: Whenever an
ageng makes an interpretation of a statute that it administers, that interpretation falls under the
Chevron framework, unless the agencg's self-interest is so conspicuously at stake that it is
implausible to infer a congressional delegation of law-interpretingpower.
Id.; see also Armstrong, supra note 221, at 207. As Armstrong stated:
The courts have correctly refused to defer to agency legal interpretations that
implicate the interpreting agency's self-interest . . . . The preferable analytical
approach would be to evaluate claims that an agency has acted in a self-aggrandizing
manner entirely outside the scope of the Chevron doctrine.
Id.
231. See Note, The SEC Is Not an Independent Ageng, 126 HARV. L. REV. 781, 797 n.123
(2013) (discussing New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88 (2010))
(supporting an extra-Chevron position because the Supreme Court "rejected the NLRB's selfinterested interpretation of its quorum requirement without even addressing Chevron").
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CONCLUSION

This Article brings attention to a previously unaddressed category of
problematic agency behavior that threatens a core protection of the
Bankruptcy Code. The forms of shapeshifting described above are a threat
to the debtor's various stakeholders, the integrity of the bankruptcy process,
and more broadly, the perceived justification for expansive regulatory
deference. The modest solutions I suggest are not the only options to
remedy and prevent shapeshifting behavior, neither is adoption of any
single modification likely to remedy the issues such behavior creates.
Further, relying upon traditional separation of powers checks turns a blind
eye to the core complexity of shapeshifting agency action. As illustrated by
the principal-agent comparison, administrative agencies act in an
entangled network of relationships. Perhaps with additional scrutiny and
evaluation, a collaborative solution can be formulated to deter agency
shapeshifting behavior in bankruptcy and beyond. Agency expertise is only
valuable if it is used responsibly and can be trusted. Similarly, the
bankruptcy system's ability to discharge debt relies on public trust that the
process will protect value and equitably distribute assets. By correcting one
ongoing misstep in both systems, this Article attempts to move toward that
goal.

